The integration test only exercised the launch-PIN path; the actual #852 report is
the "Sign in to SoulSync" username/password modal. Add login-mode cases: socketio
connect is rejected when require_login is on + unauthenticated, allowed once
login_authenticated. Confirms the WS gate covers both overlays.
The #832 fix enforces the launch PIN / login via a Flask before_request hook, but
that hook does NOT run for the socketio handshake — empirically a normal endpoint
401s while /socket.io/ returns 200 with the gate on. So removing the client overlay
(Safari "Hide Distracting Items", devtools) + opening a socket streams live data
(downloads, logs, dashboard, notifications) completely unauthenticated.
Fix: the socketio connect handler now enforces the same check and returns False
(rejects the connection) when a gate is active and the session isn't verified.
Rejecting connect blocks every downstream WS event (subscribe/join), so all live
data is covered. core/security/ws_gate.is_ws_connection_blocked is the pure seam:
login mode (when on) > launch PIN > open, mirroring the HTTP gate exactly. Fails
OPEN on a config-read error, same as the HTTP gate.
Audited every other surface empirically with the gate on + unauthenticated: SSE
streams, catch-all pages, library/dashboard data, admin endpoints, search,
image-proxy, audio-stream (incl. a /etc/passwd traversal probe) all 401; /api/v1
key-gated. The WebSocket was the only hole.
Tests (10): pure gate logic (login>pin precedence, all on/off combos) + real
socketio.test_client integration — connect rejected when gate on + unauthenticated,
allowed when gate off or PIN verified.
