Reported by @Lysticity: opening Settings reset the whole config to defaults. The
chain: GET /api/settings 500s (their env: ConfigManager missing redacted_config)
-> loadSettingsData() called response.json() WITHOUT checking response.ok, so the
error body {"error": ...} was treated as settings -> every field populated as
`settings.x?.y || ''` blanked to defaults -> autosave then wrote those defaults
over the real config.
Fix (settings.js): bail BEFORE touching any field when the response isn't ok / is
an error body, set window._settingsLoadFailed, and guard BOTH save paths
(debouncedAutoSaveSettings + saveSettings) on it. The flag clears on the next
successful load. So any load failure (500, lock, network) now leaves the saved
config untouched instead of wiping it.
The redacted_config method exists in all 2.7.x source + on dev (their 500 looks
like a stale/mismatched build), but the UI must not destroy config on ANY failed
load. Regression test pins redacted_config stays a callable method on the class
(its removal is exactly what 500s the endpoint).
Found during the #832 audit: GET /api/settings returned dict(config_data) — and
config_data is DECRYPTED in memory — so every API key, OAuth secret, Plex/
Jellyfin token, and service password went to the browser in cleartext. Fernet
"encrypted at rest" protects a leaked DB file; it does nothing once the API
hands the plaintext to the client (devtools, HAR captures, an XSS, a screen
share, or a non-PIN'd LAN viewer).
Fix (centralized in ConfigManager):
- redacted_config() deep-copies config and replaces every _SENSITIVE_PATHS value
that's actually set with REDACTED_SENTINEL; unset secrets stay empty so the UI
still shows "not configured". Dict-valued secrets (tidal/qobuz OAuth sessions)
collapse to the sentinel too. GET /api/settings now serves this copy.
- set() ignores a write of REDACTED_SENTINEL to a sensitive path, so the masked
placeholder round-tripped by an unchanged settings form can never overwrite
the real secret. A real value still saves; an empty value still clears.
Frontend: secret inputs are type=password, so the sentinel renders as dots
(looks like a saved secret). _wireRedactedSecrets() clears the mask on focus so
editing types fresh rather than onto the sentinel, and re-masks on blur if left
untouched — so an unchanged secret round-trips the sentinel (kept), an edited
one saves the new value, and a deliberately emptied one clears.
Tests: every sensitive path masks; unset stays empty; dict secrets mask; live
config not mutated; sentinel round-trip keeps the real secret; real value
overwrites; empty clears; sentinel on a non-secret path writes normally.
9 new tests; 518 config-touching tests pass (1 pre-existing soundcloud mock
failure, unrelated — fails identically on a clean tree).
