Revoked codes had a Revoke button and nothing else — the row stayed on the list for good. The reasoning was that revoke stops a live code and leaves the row behind as a record, which is right about revoke and wrong about what comes after: a revoked code is already dead. It cannot be redeemed by anyone, so keeping it only fills the list. The rule that matters is unchanged, and it is the only one that ever mattered: a code that could still be redeemed is never deletable. Deleting one takes it off the list without taking it out of anybody's inbox — the holder keeps something that looks valid, it quietly stops working, and nothing is left to say who had it. Revoke is what stops such a code; deleting it afterwards is the second half of the same thought, and it was missing. Also removed a note that had been wrong since codes became copyable: "The code is shown once, here. Only its hash is stored, so it cannot be read again afterwards." Both sentences stopped being true when the cipher was added so an invitation could be handed to somebody later than the moment it was made. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Dv6sqaY6Vq3ChZHMem3cnU
317 lines
17 KiB
JavaScript
317 lines
17 KiB
JavaScript
const { test } = require('node:test');
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const assert = require('node:assert/strict');
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const fs = require('node:fs');
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const path = require('node:path');
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function read(relativePath) {
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return fs.readFileSync(path.join(__dirname, '..', relativePath), 'utf8');
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}
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test('redactor removes PHI and common secret patterns from logs', () => {
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const { redact } = require('../src/utils/redact');
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const input = 'Authorization: Bearer abc.def.ghi password=secret123 token=tok_1234567890 email test@example.com MRN 123456789';
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const output = redact(input);
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assert.doesNotMatch(output, /abc\.def\.ghi/);
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assert.doesNotMatch(output, /secret123/);
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assert.doesNotMatch(output, /tok_1234567890/);
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assert.doesNotMatch(output, /test@example\.com/);
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assert.doesNotMatch(output, /123456789/);
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assert.match(output, /\[REDACTED\]|\[JWT\]/);
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});
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test('URL safety helper blocks private network targets', () => {
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const { isPrivateIp } = require('../src/utils/urlSafety');
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assert.equal(isPrivateIp('127.0.0.1'), true);
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assert.equal(isPrivateIp('10.0.0.5'), true);
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assert.equal(isPrivateIp('172.16.0.1'), true);
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assert.equal(isPrivateIp('192.168.1.10'), true);
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assert.equal(isPrivateIp('169.254.169.254'), true);
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assert.equal(isPrivateIp('100.64.0.1'), true);
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assert.equal(isPrivateIp('::1'), true);
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assert.equal(isPrivateIp('fe80::1'), true);
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assert.equal(isPrivateIp('8.8.8.8'), false);
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assert.equal(isPrivateIp('2606:4700:4700::1111'), false);
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});
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test('Nextcloud/WebDAV routes enforce SSRF guard and redirect blocking', () => {
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// One route reaches Nextcloud now. The second caller was Learning Hub's
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// WebDAV browser, retired with it.
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const nextcloud = read('src/routes/nextcloud.js');
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assert.match(nextcloud, /assertSafeHttpsUrl\(cleanUrl, 'Nextcloud URL'\)/);
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assert.match(nextcloud, /assertSafeHttpsUrl\(user\.nextcloud_url, 'Nextcloud URL'\)/);
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assert.match(nextcloud, /maxRedirects: 0/);
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assert.match(nextcloud, /encodeURIComponent\(username\)/);
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});
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test('logs and audits avoid unbounded limits and PHI-prone details', () => {
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const logs = read('src/routes/logs.js');
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const encounters = read('src/routes/encounters.js');
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const documents = read('src/routes/documents.js');
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assert.match(logs, /function clampLimit/);
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assert.match(logs, /clampLimit\(req\.query\.limit, 50, 200\)/);
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assert.match(logs, /logger\.warn\('client_error'/);
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assert.match(logs, /redact\(trimField\(e\.stack, 1200\)\)/);
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assert.doesNotMatch(logs, /console\.error\('\[CLIENT ERROR\]'/);
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assert.doesNotMatch(encounters, /Saved encounter: ' \+ \(label/);
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assert.doesNotMatch(encounters, /Loaded encounter: ' \+ \(row\.label/);
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assert.doesNotMatch(documents, /Uploaded: ' \+ \(req\.file/);
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});
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// adminMiddleware only checks req.user.role; without authMiddleware having run,
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// req.user is undefined. These routes were protected only because adminConfig
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// happens to be mounted on /api/admin first and guards the whole path.
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test('admin routers state their own authentication, not mount order', () => {
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const fs = require('node:fs');
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const path = require('node:path');
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const root = path.join(__dirname, '..');
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for (const file of ['adminMilestones.js', 'admin.js', 'adminConfig.js', 'adminDocs.js']) {
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const src = fs.readFileSync(path.join(root, 'src/routes', file), 'utf8');
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assert.match(src, /router\.use\(authMiddleware\);/, file + ' authenticates every route it serves');
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}
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const auth = fs.readFileSync(path.join(root, 'src/middleware/auth.js'), 'utf8');
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assert.match(auth, /async function adminMiddleware\(req, res, next\) \{\s*\n\s*if \(!req\.user \|\| req\.user\.role !== 'admin'\)/,
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'and the role check stays a role check, so it fails closed on its own');
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});
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// Three S3 schemes grew separately — S3_*, GENERATED_IMAGES_S3_*, and later
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// audio backups — which is why pointing the app at a different MinIO meant
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// hunting through three files. One resolver answers it for every purpose.
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test('object storage resolves the same way for every purpose', () => {
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const storage = require('../src/utils/objectStorage');
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// One endpoint plus a bucket name per purpose is enough for all of them.
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const shared = { S3_ENDPOINT: 'https://s3.example.com', S3_ACCESS_KEY: 'AK', S3_SECRET_KEY: 'SK',
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S3_BUCKET_AUDIO_BACKUPS: 'audio', S3_BUCKET_GENERATED_IMAGES: 'images', S3_BUCKET: 'docs' };
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for (const [purpose, bucket] of [['audio-backups', 'audio'], ['generated-images', 'images'], ['documents', 'docs']]) {
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const resolved = storage.settingsFor(purpose, shared);
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assert.equal(resolved.bucket, bucket, purpose + ' finds its bucket');
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assert.equal(resolved.endpoint, 'https://s3.example.com');
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assert.deepEqual(resolved.credentials, { accessKeyId: 'AK', secretAccessKey: 'SK' });
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}
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// A purpose that needs its own account still overrides everything.
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const overridden = storage.settingsFor('audio-backups',
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Object.assign({}, shared, { AUDIO_BACKUPS_S3_ENDPOINT: 'http://assets:9000', AUDIO_BACKUPS_S3_BUCKET: 'audio-backups' }));
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assert.equal(overridden.endpoint, 'http://assets:9000');
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assert.equal(overridden.bucket, 'audio-backups');
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// Existing deployments keep working untouched, including the old key names.
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const legacy = storage.settingsFor('documents',
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{ S3_BUCKET: 'd', S3_REGION: 'us-west-004', S3_ENDPOINT: 'https://b2', S3_ACCESS_KEY_ID: 'A', S3_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY: 'B' });
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assert.equal(legacy.region, 'us-west-004');
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assert.deepEqual(legacy.credentials, { accessKeyId: 'A', secretAccessKey: 'B' });
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// Documents defaulted path-style off; a Backblaze endpoint must keep working.
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assert.equal(legacy.forcePathStyle, false);
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assert.equal(storage.settingsFor('audio-backups', { AUDIO_BACKUPS_S3_BUCKET: 'a', AUDIO_BACKUPS_S3_ENDPOINT: 'http://assets:9000' }).forcePathStyle, true,
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'but MinIO needs it, so a custom endpoint turns it on where there is no older default');
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// No bucket means "not configured" — never an error, since all of this is optional.
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assert.equal(storage.settingsFor('audio-backups', {}), null);
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assert.equal(storage.isConfigured('audio-backups', {}), false);
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// A mounted secret must not be overridden by an inherited environment value.
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const fs = require('node:fs'); const os = require('node:os'); const path = require('node:path');
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const keyFile = path.join(fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'objstore-')), 'key');
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fs.writeFileSync(keyFile, 'from-file\n');
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const fileWins = storage.settingsFor('audio-backups',
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{ AUDIO_BACKUPS_S3_BUCKET: 'a', AUDIO_BACKUPS_S3_ACCESS_KEY: 'inline', AUDIO_BACKUPS_S3_ACCESS_KEY_FILE: keyFile, AUDIO_BACKUPS_S3_SECRET_KEY: 'S' });
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assert.equal(fileWins.credentials.accessKeyId, 'from-file');
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});
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// .env.example listed 18 of the 67 variables the app reads, so anyone setting
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// up a deployment had to find the rest by reading source.
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test('.env.example documents every variable the app reads', () => {
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const fs = require('node:fs');
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const path = require('node:path');
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const root = path.join(__dirname, '..');
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const read = f => fs.readFileSync(path.join(root, f), 'utf8');
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const sources = ['server.js'].concat(
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fs.readdirSync(path.join(root, 'src'), { recursive: true })
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.filter(f => String(f).endsWith('.js')).map(f => path.join('src', String(f))));
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const used = new Set();
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for (const file of sources) {
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for (const m of read(file).matchAll(/process\.env\.([A-Z_0-9]+)/g)) used.add(m[1]);
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}
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// Set by node:test in its own child processes, never by a deployment.
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used.delete('NODE_TEST_CONTEXT');
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const documented = new Set(
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[...read('.env.example').matchAll(/^#?\s*([A-Z_0-9]+)=/gm)].map(m => m[1]));
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const missing = [...used].filter(name => !documented.has(name)).sort();
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assert.deepEqual(missing, [], 'undocumented variables: ' + missing.join(', '));
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});
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// registration_enabled is open-or-closed. Invite-only is the middle setting,
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// and it has to hold up against someone probing codes.
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test('an invitation is deletable only once it can no longer be used', () => {
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const src = read('src/utils/registrationInvites.js');
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const route = read('src/routes/adminConfig.js');
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// A code that could still be redeemed may be sitting in somebody's inbox.
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// Deleting the row takes it off the list without taking it out of their
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// hands: it quietly stops working and nothing is left to say who held it.
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// Revoke is what stops such a code — and a revoked one is then dead, so it
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// is deletable like any other spent code.
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assert.match(src, /var SPENT = '\(used_at IS NOT NULL OR revoked_at IS NOT NULL OR expires_at <= NOW\(\)\)';/);
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assert.match(src, /DELETE FROM registration_invites WHERE id = \$1 AND ' \+ SPENT/);
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assert.match(src, /DELETE FROM registration_invites WHERE ' \+ SPENT/, 'and in bulk');
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// Scoped to the rule itself. revoked_at IS NULL appears elsewhere and
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// belongs there: revoke() will not re-revoke, and claim() will not redeem a
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// revoked code. It is only in *this* rule that it meant "keep it forever".
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const spentRule = src.slice(src.indexOf('var SPENT ='), src.indexOf('var SPENT =') + 120);
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assert.doesNotMatch(spentRule, /revoked_at IS NULL/, 'a revoked code is spent, not protected');
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assert.match(spentRule, /revoked_at IS NOT NULL/);
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// Refused with the reason, not as a missing row: the row is very likely there.
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assert.match(route, /That invitation can still be used\. Revoke it instead\./);
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assert.match(route, /res\.status\(409\)/);
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// The bulk route is declared before /invites/:id, or "spent" is read as an id.
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assert.ok(route.indexOf("router.delete('/invites/spent'") < route.indexOf("router.delete('/invites/:id'"));
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// And the button is only offered where it can work.
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const js = read('public/js/admin.js');
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assert.match(js, /var SPENT_STATUS = \['used', 'expired', 'revoked'\];/);
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assert.match(js, /SPENT_STATUS\.indexOf\(row\.status\) !== -1\s*\n?\s*\? '<button type="button" class="btn-sm btn-ghost admin-invite-delete/);
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assert.match(js, /Delete every used, revoked and expired invitation\? Ones that can still be redeemed are kept\./);
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assert.match(js, /clear\.hidden = spent === 0;/, 'and hidden when there are none');
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});
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test('registration invites are single-use, expiring, and safe to store', () => {
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const fs = require('node:fs');
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const path = require('node:path');
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const root = path.join(__dirname, '..');
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const read = f => fs.readFileSync(path.join(root, f), 'utf8');
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const invites = require('../src/utils/registrationInvites');
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const migration = read('migrations/1780100000000_registration-invites.js');
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const auth = read('src/routes/auth.js');
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// A code must not be recoverable from a database dump.
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assert.match(migration, /code_hash TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE/);
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assert.doesNotMatch(migration, /\bcode TEXT\b/, 'the code itself is never stored');
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assert.equal(invites.hash('abcd-efgh'), invites.hash('ABCDEFGH'), 'hashing normalises case and separators');
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assert.notEqual(invites.hash('a'), 'a');
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// Generated codes avoid characters that are misread when typed from a screen.
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const code = invites.generateCode();
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assert.match(code, /^[0-9A-Z]{4}-[0-9A-Z]{4}-[0-9A-Z]{4}-[0-9A-Z]{4}$/);
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assert.doesNotMatch(code, /[ILOU]/, 'no I, L, O or U');
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assert.notEqual(invites.generateCode(), invites.generateCode());
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// Expiry is bounded, and a nonsense value falls back rather than throwing.
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assert.equal(invites.ttlDays(undefined), invites.DEFAULT_TTL_DAYS);
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assert.equal(invites.ttlDays(0), invites.DEFAULT_TTL_DAYS);
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assert.equal(invites.ttlDays('nonsense'), invites.DEFAULT_TTL_DAYS);
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assert.equal(invites.ttlDays(10000), invites.MAX_TTL_DAYS);
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// The claim is one conditional UPDATE, so two registrations racing the same
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// code cannot both succeed.
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const claim = read('src/utils/registrationInvites.js');
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assert.match(claim, /UPDATE registration_invites SET used_at = NOW\(\), used_by = \$1 /);
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assert.match(claim, /WHERE code_hash = \$2 AND used_at IS NULL AND revoked_at IS NULL AND expires_at > NOW\(\)/);
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assert.match(claim, /RETURNING id/);
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// Losing that race must not leave a free account behind.
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assert.match(auth, /if \(!claimedInvite\) \{[\s\S]{0,120}DELETE FROM users WHERE id = \?/);
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// And the rejection must not say which of the four reasons applied.
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assert.match(auth, /may have expired, been revoked, or already been used/);
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});
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// With several admins, everything in the panel was editable by all of them.
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// Lockdown separates running the service from changing how it behaves.
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test('admin lockdown refuses configuration writes at the server', () => {
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const lockdown = require('../src/utils/adminLockdown');
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const off = {};
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const on = { ADMIN_LOCKDOWN: 'true' };
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// It is an environment variable, not a setting: a setting could be switched
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// off by the very admin it restrains.
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assert.equal(lockdown.enabled(off), false);
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assert.equal(lockdown.enabled({ ADMIN_LOCKDOWN: 'false' }), false);
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assert.equal(lockdown.enabled(on), true);
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// Off, nothing is locked.
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assert.equal(lockdown.isLocked('prompt.hpi', off), false);
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// On, configuration is locked and day-to-day operation is not.
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for (const key of ['prompt.hpi', 'clinical_assistant.chat_model', 'models.default',
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'tts.voice', 'stt.model', 'smtp.host', 'email.verify.subject']) {
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assert.equal(lockdown.isLocked(key, on), true, key + ' is locked');
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}
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for (const key of ['announcement.text', 'registration_enabled',
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'registration_invite_only', 'feature.memories', 'site.name']) {
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assert.equal(lockdown.isLocked(key, on), false, key + ' stays editable');
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}
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// A setting added later is locked until someone decides otherwise, rather
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// than defaulting to open.
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assert.equal(lockdown.isLocked('something.invented.later', on), true);
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const fs = require('node:fs');
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const path = require('node:path');
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const admin = fs.readFileSync(path.join(__dirname, '..', 'src/routes/adminConfig.js'), 'utf8');
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// One gate, not a check per route: a route added later cannot miss it.
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assert.match(admin, /if \(!lockdown\.enabled\(\) \|\| req\.method === 'GET' \|\| req\.method === 'HEAD'\) return next\(\);/);
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assert.match(admin, /if \(OPERATIONAL_WRITE\.test\(req\.path\)\) return next\(\);/);
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assert.match(admin, /return res\.status\(403\)\.json\(\{ error: lockdown\.refusal/);
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// And the per-key rule for the generic settings route.
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assert.match(admin, /if \(lockdown\.isLocked\(key\)\) \{\s*\n\s*return res\.status\(403\)/);
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// The panel learns the state from a response it already fetches, rather than
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// adding a request of its own on every admin open.
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assert.match(admin, /inviteOnly: await invites\.inviteOnly\(\), lockdown: lockdown\.state\(\)/);
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const panel = fs.readFileSync(path.join(__dirname, '..', 'public/js/admin.js'), 'utf8');
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assert.match(panel, /window\.applyAdminLockdown\(data\.lockdown\)/);
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});
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// A citation that resolves to nothing is never rendered as a link, so without
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// counting it, nobody ever learns it happened.
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test('citation quality is measured on the server, where answer and sources both exist', () => {
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const audit = require('../src/utils/citationAudit');
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const sources = [{ number: 1 }, { number: 2 }, { number: 3 }];
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const good = audit.audit('Bronchiolitis is managed supportively [1]. Steroids do not help [2, 3].', sources);
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assert.equal(good.cited, 3);
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assert.deepEqual(good.unverifiableNumbers, []);
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// The case that motivated this: a number no source matched.
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const over = audit.audit('Supportive care [1] and also this [7].', sources);
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assert.equal(over.cited, 2);
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assert.deepEqual(over.unverifiableNumbers, [7]);
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// Repeats are one problem, not three.
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assert.deepEqual(audit.audit('[7] and [7] and [7]', sources).unverifiableNumbers, [7]);
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// A bracketed number inside code is content, not a citation.
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assert.deepEqual(audit.audit('```\nconst a = arr[7];\n```', sources).unverifiableNumbers, []);
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assert.deepEqual(audit.audit('Use `arr[7]` here.', sources).unverifiableNumbers, []);
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// Sources are matched on their assigned number, the same way rendering does.
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assert.deepEqual(audit.audit('[5]', [{ number: 5 }]).unverifiableNumbers, []);
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// Recording must never be able to fail an answer.
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assert.doesNotThrow(() => audit.record(null, null));
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assert.doesNotThrow(() => audit.record('[1]', undefined));
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const fs = require('node:fs');
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const path = require('node:path');
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const route = fs.readFileSync(path.join(__dirname, '..', 'src/routes/clinicalAssistant.js'), 'utf8');
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// Not awaited: the clinician is waiting for the answer.
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// One tracker for both answer paths — the streaming one and the fallback the
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// client uses when streaming fails. Auditing only the first would make
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// exactly the answers produced under failure invisible.
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assert.match(route, /function trackCitations\(req, question, answer, sources\)/);
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assert.match(route, /trackCitations\(req, prepared\.message, answer, safeSources\);/, 'streaming');
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assert.match(route, /trackCitations\(req, prepared\.message, answer, fallbackSources\);/, 'fallback');
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// Loaded on demand and allowed to be absent: observation must never be able
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// to fail an answer.
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assert.match(route, /function citationTracker\(\)/);
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assert.match(route, /if \(!tracker\) return;/);
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assert.match(route, /tracker\.store\(req\.user\.id, question, result, sources\);/);
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});
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