Two independent PHI-leak hardenings folded together:
1. forgot-password timing oracle
The hit path previously did SELECT + token gen + UPDATE + SMTP send
before responding; the miss path returned after the SELECT. An
attacker could distinguish registered emails by response latency
(SMTP RTT is hundreds of ms). Response is now sent immediately after
Turnstile, with the DB and email work fired-and-forgotten in a
background async block. Hit and miss take identical wall-clock time.
Also hardened req.body.email to tolerate missing/non-string input
instead of throwing 500.
2. logger.file redaction
logger.info/warn/error wrote straight to /app/data/logs/YYYY-MM-DD.log
without going through redact(). Current callers are metadata-only and
safe, but any future caller writing logger.error('boom', req.body)
would silently drop PHI to disk. Route both message and optional data
through redact() — same helper the audit path already uses. Benign
startup messages pass through unchanged; SSN/phone/email/DOB patterns
are tokenised, long note-body-shaped text is truncated.
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