// ============================================================ // OIDC ROUTES — OpenID Connect SSO authentication // Compatible with: Azure AD, Okta, Keycloak, PocketID, Google // ============================================================ var express = require('express'); var router = express.Router(); var crypto = require('crypto'); var jwt = require('jsonwebtoken'); var dns = require('dns').promises; var net = require('net'); var db = require('../db/database'); var { JWT_SECRET, authMiddleware, adminMiddleware } = require('../middleware/auth'); var { hashToken, parseUserAgent, generateSessionId } = require('../utils/sessions'); var { isMobileClient } = require('../utils/platform'); // SSRF guard: reject issuer URLs that resolve to private / loopback / link-local IPs. // Prevents an admin (or compromised admin account) from pointing OIDC at AWS metadata etc. function isPrivateIp(ip) { if (!ip) return true; if (net.isIPv4(ip)) { var p = ip.split('.').map(Number); if (p[0] === 10) return true; if (p[0] === 127) return true; if (p[0] === 0) return true; if (p[0] === 169 && p[1] === 254) return true; if (p[0] === 172 && p[1] >= 16 && p[1] <= 31) return true; if (p[0] === 192 && p[1] === 168) return true; if (p[0] >= 224) return true; return false; } if (net.isIPv6(ip)) { var low = ip.toLowerCase(); if (low === '::1' || low === '::' ) return true; if (low.startsWith('fe80:') || low.startsWith('fc') || low.startsWith('fd')) return true; return false; } return true; } async function assertSafeIssuer(urlStr) { var u = new URL(urlStr); if (u.protocol !== 'https:') throw new Error('OIDC issuer must use https://'); var addrs = await dns.lookup(u.hostname, { all: true }); for (var i = 0; i < addrs.length; i++) { if (isPrivateIp(addrs[i].address)) throw new Error('OIDC issuer resolves to a private IP (blocked)'); } } // Transaction lives only in an HttpOnly cookie; the URL contains an opaque challenge. // ponytail: one pending login per browser; keyed cookies only if parallel logins are needed. var transactionCookie = 'ped_oidc'; var transactionOptions = { httpOnly: true, secure: true, sameSite: 'lax', path: '/api/auth/oidc' }; var transactionTTL = 5 * 60 * 1000; function signState(payload) { var body = Buffer.from(JSON.stringify(payload)).toString('base64url'); var sig = crypto.createHmac('sha256', JWT_SECRET).update(body).digest('base64url'); return body + '.' + sig; } function verifyState(token) { if (typeof token !== 'string' || token.length > 2048) return null; var parts = token.split('.'); if (parts.length !== 2 || !/^[A-Za-z0-9_-]+$/.test(parts[0]) || !/^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{43}$/.test(parts[1])) return null; var expected = crypto.createHmac('sha256', JWT_SECRET).update(parts[0]).digest('base64url'); if (parts[1].length !== expected.length || !crypto.timingSafeEqual(Buffer.from(parts[1]), Buffer.from(expected))) return null; try { var payload = JSON.parse(Buffer.from(parts[0], 'base64url').toString('utf8')); if (!payload || !Number.isSafeInteger(payload.expires) || payload.expires <= Date.now() || payload.expires > Date.now() + transactionTTL) return null; if (typeof payload.s !== 'string' || !/^[a-f0-9]{48}$/.test(payload.s) || typeof payload.n !== 'string' || !/^[a-f0-9]{48}$/.test(payload.n) || typeof payload.v !== 'string' || !/^[A-Za-z0-9._~-]{43,128}$/.test(payload.v)) return null; return payload; } catch (e) { return null; } } function setAuthCookie(res, token) { var isProduction = process.env.NODE_ENV === 'production' || process.env.APP_URL; res.cookie('ped_auth', token, { httpOnly: true, secure: !!isProduction, sameSite: 'lax', maxAge: 30 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000, // 30d safety net; middleware enforces 24h sliding idle path: '/' }); } // ── GET OIDC status (public — frontend checks this to show SSO button) ── router.get('/oidc-status', async function(req, res) { try { var enabled = await db.getSetting('oidc.enabled'); var disableLocal = await db.getSetting('oidc.disable_local_auth'); var buttonLabel = await db.getSetting('oidc.button_label'); res.json({ oidcEnabled: enabled === 'true', disableLocalAuth: enabled === 'true' && disableLocal === 'true', buttonLabel: buttonLabel || 'Sign in with SSO' }); } catch (e) { res.json({ oidcEnabled: false, disableLocalAuth: false }); } }); // Which role a set of SSO group names earns. Empty settings mean "off": roles // stay whatever they are locally. A claim that is a string is read as a // comma- or space-separated list, since providers differ; names are compared // case-blind; admin beats moderator; a member of neither is a user. function parseGroupList(value) { return String(value || '').split(/[,\s]+/).map(function (g) { return g.trim().toLowerCase(); }).filter(Boolean); } async function roleFromGroups(claim) { var admins = parseGroupList(await db.getSetting('oidc.admin_groups')); var moderators = parseGroupList(await db.getSetting('oidc.moderator_groups')); if (!admins.length && !moderators.length) return null; if (claim == null) return null; var groups = Array.isArray(claim) ? claim.map(function (g) { return String(g).toLowerCase(); }) : parseGroupList(claim); if (admins.some(function (g) { return groups.indexOf(g) !== -1; })) return 'admin'; if (moderators.some(function (g) { return groups.indexOf(g) !== -1; })) return 'moderator'; return 'user'; } // ── GET /api/auth/oidc — initiate OIDC login (redirects to IdP) ────────── router.get('/oidc', async function(req, res) { try { var enabled = await db.getSetting('oidc.enabled'); if (enabled !== 'true') { return res.status(400).json({ error: 'SSO is not enabled' }); } var issuer = await db.getSetting('oidc.issuer'); var clientId = await db.getSetting('oidc.client_id'); if (!issuer || !clientId) { return res.status(500).json({ error: 'OIDC not fully configured' }); } var oidc = require('openid-client'); var appUrl = (process.env.APP_URL || 'http://localhost:3000').replace(/\/$/, ''); var redirectUri = appUrl + '/api/auth/oidc/callback'; await assertSafeIssuer(issuer); var config = await oidc.discovery(new URL(issuer), clientId); var nonce = crypto.randomBytes(24).toString('hex'); var codeVerifier = oidc.randomPKCECodeVerifier(); var codeChallenge = await oidc.calculatePKCECodeChallenge(codeVerifier); // A silent attempt asks the provider for an answer without showing anyone // anything: signed in there already means signed in here, the way a // Kerberos ticket works; not signed in there comes back as a refusal the // callback turns into the ordinary sign-in page. The page starts it once // per browser session, never after an explicit sign-out. var silent = req.query.silent === '1'; var state = crypto.randomBytes(24).toString('hex'); res.cookie(transactionCookie, signState({ s: state, n: nonce, v: codeVerifier, q: silent ? 1 : 0, expires: Date.now() + transactionTTL }), Object.assign({ maxAge: transactionTTL }, transactionOptions)); var authParams = { redirect_uri: redirectUri, scope: 'openid email profile', state: state, nonce: nonce, code_challenge: codeChallenge, code_challenge_method: 'S256' }; if (silent) authParams.prompt = 'none'; var authUrl = oidc.buildAuthorizationUrl(config, authParams); res.redirect(authUrl.href); } catch (err) { res.clearCookie(transactionCookie, transactionOptions); console.error('[OIDC] Auth initiation failed'); res.status(500).json({ error: 'SSO login failed' }); } }); // ── GET /api/auth/oidc/callback — handle IdP callback ──────────────────── router.get('/oidc/callback', async function(req, res) { var appUrl = (process.env.APP_URL || 'http://localhost:3000').replace(/\/$/, ''); res.clearCookie(transactionCookie, transactionOptions); try { var state = req.query.state; var pending = verifyState(req.cookies && req.cookies[transactionCookie]); if (typeof state !== 'string' || !/^[a-f0-9]{48}$/.test(state) || !pending || pending.s !== state) { return res.redirect(appUrl + '?error=invalid_state'); } if (typeof req.query.error === 'string' && req.query.error) { // login_required / interaction_required / consent_required: the provider // could not answer without a person. For a silent attempt that is the // expected "no session there" and the page simply shows sign-in. if (pending.q === 1) return res.redirect(appUrl + '?sso=none'); return res.redirect(appUrl + '?error=sso_failed'); } if (await db.getSetting('oidc.enabled') !== 'true') return res.redirect(appUrl + '?error=sso_disabled'); var issuer = await db.getSetting('oidc.issuer'); var clientId = await db.getSetting('oidc.client_id'); var clientSecret = await db.getSetting('oidc.client_secret'); var oidc = require('openid-client'); var redirectUri = appUrl + '/api/auth/oidc/callback'; await assertSafeIssuer(issuer); var config = await oidc.discovery(new URL(issuer), clientId, clientSecret || undefined); var tokens = await oidc.authorizationCodeGrant(config, new URL(req.protocol + '://' + req.get('host') + req.originalUrl), { pkceCodeVerifier: pending.v, expectedNonce: pending.n, expectedState: state }); var claims = tokens.claims(); var sub = claims.sub; if (typeof sub !== 'string' || !sub || sub.length > 255) return res.redirect(appUrl + '?error=invalid_identity'); var email = claims.email; var emailVerified = claims.email_verified; var name = claims.name || claims.preferred_username || email; if (!email) { // Try userinfo endpoint var userinfo = await oidc.fetchUserInfo(config, tokens.access_token, sub); email = userinfo.email; if (typeof emailVerified === 'undefined') emailVerified = userinfo.email_verified; name = name || userinfo.name || userinfo.preferred_username || email; } if (!email) { return res.redirect(appUrl + '?error=no_email'); } email = email.toLowerCase(); // Find or create user var user = await db.get('SELECT * FROM users WHERE email = ?', [email]); if (user) { if (user.disabled) return res.redirect(appUrl + '?error=disabled'); // Existing user. Two safe linking paths: // 1. Already linked (oidc_sub matches) → log in // 2. Not yet linked → auto-link ONLY if both local and IdP email // are verified. Otherwise an attacker could squat on // an email they don't own and take over the local account. if (user.oidc_sub && user.oidc_sub !== sub) { console.warn('[OIDC] sub mismatch on existing user id=' + user.id + ' — IdP returned different sub than recorded. Refusing to auto-relink.'); return res.redirect(appUrl + '?error=sub_mismatch'); } if (!user.oidc_sub) { // A pre-registered, unverified account may have an attacker-known password. if (user.email_verified !== true) return res.redirect(appUrl + '?error=account_link_required'); // Some IdPs (rare) serialize booleans as strings — accept both. var verified = emailVerified === true || emailVerified === 'true'; if (!verified) { console.warn('[OIDC] refusing to auto-link existing user ' + user.id + ' — IdP did not assert email_verified=true'); return res.redirect(appUrl + '?error=email_unverified'); } await db.run('UPDATE users SET oidc_sub = ?, email_verified = true WHERE id = ?', [sub, user.id]); await db.run('INSERT INTO audit_log (user_id, action, category, details, ip_address) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?)', [user.id, 'oidc_linked', 'auth', 'Linked SSO identity ' + sub + ' via ' + issuer, req.ip]).catch(function(){}); } } else { // Auto-create user from OIDC var userCount = await db.get('SELECT COUNT(*) as count FROM users', []); var role = (userCount && parseInt(userCount.count) === 0) ? 'admin' : 'user'; var randomPw = crypto.randomBytes(32).toString('hex'); // Not used for OIDC login var result = await db.run( 'INSERT INTO users (email, password, name, role, email_verified, oidc_sub) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, true, ?)', [email, randomPw, name, role, sub] ); user = await db.get('SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = ?', [result.lastInsertRowid]); } // The role comes from the SSO's groups, on every sign-in, when the admin // has said which groups mean what (oidc.admin_groups, oidc.moderator_groups). // Applied every time rather than only at creation, so removal at the SSO // demotes here too. The last admin is never demoted by a claim: a group // edit at the SSO must not be able to lock everyone out of this panel. var mapped = await roleFromGroups(claims.groups); if (mapped && mapped !== user.role) { var lastAdmin = user.role === 'admin' && mapped !== 'admin' && parseInt((await db.get("SELECT COUNT(*) AS count FROM users WHERE role = 'admin' AND disabled IS NOT TRUE", [])).count, 10) <= 1; if (lastAdmin) { console.warn('[OIDC] not demoting the last admin (user ' + user.id + ') on the SSO\'s say-so'); } else { await db.run('UPDATE users SET role = ? WHERE id = ?', [mapped, user.id]); await db.run('INSERT INTO audit_log (user_id, action, category, details, ip_address) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?)', [user.id, 'oidc_role', 'auth', 'Role ' + user.role + ' → ' + mapped + ' from SSO groups', req.ip]).catch(function(){}); user.role = mapped; } } // Issue JWT var token = jwt.sign({ userId: user.id }, JWT_SECRET, { expiresIn: isMobileClient(req) ? '365d' : '30d' }); // Persist the session before issuing any authentication cookie. var ssoSessionId = generateSessionId(); await db.run('INSERT INTO user_sessions (id, user_id, token_hash, ip_address, user_agent, device_label) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)', [ssoSessionId, user.id, hashToken(token), req.ip, req.headers['user-agent'] || '', parseUserAgent(req.headers['user-agent'])]); await db.run('INSERT INTO audit_log (user_id, action, ip_address, details) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?)', [user.id, 'login_oidc', req.ip, 'SSO via ' + issuer]); setAuthCookie(res, token); // Redirect to app — token is in httpOnly cookie, pass session ID res.redirect(appUrl + '?sso=ok&sid=' + ssoSessionId); } catch (err) { // IdP errors can contain callback URLs or PKCE material; do not log them. console.error('[OIDC] Callback failed'); res.redirect(appUrl + '?error=sso_failed'); } }); // ── Admin: GET OIDC config ────────────────────────────────────────────── router.get('/oidc/config', authMiddleware, adminMiddleware, async function(req, res) { try { var keys = ['oidc.enabled', 'oidc.issuer', 'oidc.client_id', 'oidc.client_secret', 'oidc.disable_local_auth', 'oidc.button_label', 'oidc.allowed_ips', 'oidc.admin_groups', 'oidc.moderator_groups']; var config = {}; for (var i = 0; i < keys.length; i++) { config[keys[i]] = await db.getSetting(keys[i]) || ''; } // Mask client secret if (config['oidc.client_secret']) { config['oidc.client_secret'] = '••••••••' + config['oidc.client_secret'].slice(-4); } res.json({ success: true, config: config }); } catch (e) { res.status(500).json({ error: 'Request failed' }); } }); // ── Admin: PUT update OIDC config ─────────────────────────────────────── router.put('/oidc/config', authMiddleware, adminMiddleware, async function(req, res) { try { // The sign-in provider is the most consequential setting there is; under // lockdown it is read-only like every other setting that changes how the // service behaves. This router is not behind the admin gate, so it says so itself. if (lockdown.enabled()) return res.status(403).json({ error: lockdown.refusal('oidc') }); var allowed = ['oidc.enabled', 'oidc.issuer', 'oidc.client_id', 'oidc.client_secret', 'oidc.disable_local_auth', 'oidc.button_label', 'oidc.allowed_ips', 'oidc.admin_groups', 'oidc.moderator_groups']; var updates = req.body; for (var i = 0; i < allowed.length; i++) { var key = allowed[i]; if (updates[key] !== undefined) { // Don't overwrite secret with masked value if (key === 'oidc.client_secret' && updates[key].indexOf('••••') === 0) continue; await db.setSetting(key, updates[key]); } } res.json({ success: true }); } catch (e) { res.status(500).json({ error: 'Request failed' }); } }); module.exports = router; module.exports.roleFromGroups = roleFromGroups; module.exports.parseGroupList = parseGroupList;