Commit graph

3 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Daniel
f89dc01729 refactor: one place decides which bucket, on which S3, with which credentials
Three S3 configurations had grown separately — S3_* for documents,
GENERATED_IMAGES_S3_* for images, and AUDIO_BACKUPS_S3_* after them — with
different key names and their own client construction. That is why moving
storage meant hunting through several files.

src/utils/objectStorage.js now resolves settings for any purpose: its own
variables first, then the shared S3_* ones, with a per-purpose bucket name
(S3_BUCKET_AUDIO_BACKUPS). One endpoint plus three bucket names is enough
for the whole app, and a purpose that needs its own account still overrides
everything. Audio backups and documents use it; generated images keeps its
own tested storage module, whose variable names the resolver already
understands.

Nothing existing has to change: S3_ACCESS_KEY_ID, S3_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY and
the AWS_* fallbacks still resolve, and path-style addressing keeps each
purpose's previous default — off for documents, so a Backblaze endpoint
behaves as before, on where a custom endpoint implies MinIO. A _FILE
credential now always beats an inline one, so a mounted secret cannot be
shadowed by an inherited environment variable.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Dv6sqaY6Vq3ChZHMem3cnU
2026-09-10 17:09:13 +02:00
Daniel
dca1ebb6fe fix: admin routers authenticate themselves; track the audit in TODO
- adminMilestones was reached only because adminConfig is mounted on
  /api/admin ahead of it and guards the whole path. adminMiddleware checks
  req.user.role and nothing else, so it failed closed (403) rather than
  open — but on mount order, not intent. It now states the requirement,
  with a test covering all four admin routers.
- TODO.md records the whole audit: what was verified working (live
  transcription round trip, voice mode wiring), what was fixed, the two
  advisories that are unreachable and why, and the CI/CD and Kubernetes
  work worth doing before scaling out.

Security review found nothing else exploitable: parameterised SQL
throughout (the one interpolated table name is allowlisted), CORS refuses
to start open in production, JWT_SECRET refuses to start unset in
production, rate limits on /api and each auth route, a real CSP, and no
secrets in the repo.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Dv6sqaY6Vq3ChZHMem3cnU
2026-09-10 16:03:20 +02:00
Daniel
a6807ef7a4 add hardening and metrics tests 2026-05-08 19:08:29 +02:00