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2 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Daniel
6fa0d87da4 refactor(ts): day 4 — middleware + utils + db .js → .ts (24 files)
All remaining backend files renamed:
  src/middleware/auth.ts, logging.ts (2 files)
  src/utils/*.ts         (20 files: ai, auditQueue, config, crypto,
                          embeddings, errors, fileType, logger, models,
                          notify, passwords, platform, promptSafe,
                          prompts, redact, sessions, transcribe*,
                          ttsGoogle)
  src/db/database.ts, migrate.ts (2 files)

Spot-fixes to satisfy tsc (all within the spirit of 'no behavior
change' — added `: any` annotations where the original JS relied on
duck typing that tsc's default inference narrows too aggressively):

  utils/ai.ts — body, converseParams, request literals + fallback
    result object + err.code/model/message casts. AI client has lots
    of provider-specific ad-hoc object shapes; Day 5 will replace the
    `any`s with proper provider-response interfaces.
  utils/embeddings.ts — payload + request as `any`; generateEmbedding
    call sites pass `undefined as any` for the now-required second
    arg (model) until we refactor the signature.
  utils/prompts.ts — PROMPTS typed as Record<string, any> so
    .loadFromDb / .updatePrompt / .getAllPrompts attachments after
    the const literal compile.
  utils/transcribeLocal.ts — buildArgs() has two `var args = [...]`
    in the same function scope (var-hoisted); both now typed as
    any[] so they don't type-clash across conditionals.

Backend is now 54 of 54 TypeScript files, permissive mode.
`npm run typecheck` EXIT 0. Prod container still running the old
JS image — no Dockerfile change yet.

Next: Day 5 flips strict: true, fixes every error tsc surfaces, adds
Vitest + Zod + Knip tooling.
2026-04-23 19:52:16 +02:00
Daniel
6dffdf91e5 Sliding 24h idle timeout (web) + persistent mobile + 2FA backup codes
Session model:
  Web     — 24h sliding idle timeout enforced server-side via
             user_sessions.last_activity. 30-day JWT + cookie are a
             safety net; middleware is the real clock. Cookie is
             re-set on active use so browsers match the sliding window.
  Mobile  — 365-day JWT, no idle timeout (stays persistent via Keychain
             / Keystore). Detected via User-Agent ("PedScribe" /
             "Capacitor") or X-Client: mobile header.

2FA backup codes:
  - 10 single-use codes generated when 2FA is first enabled
  - Stored as bcrypt hashes in new users.totp_backup_codes column
  - Consumed atomically on successful login fallback (when TOTP fails)
  - Regenerate endpoint (POST /api/auth/2fa/backup-codes) requires
    current password; invalidates prior codes
  - Count endpoint (GET /api/auth/2fa/backup-codes/count) powers a
    "N codes remaining" indicator on the 2FA settings card
  - Modal shows codes exactly once with Copy + Download .txt actions
  - Codes cleared when 2FA is disabled

New files:
  src/utils/platform.js — isMobileClient() helper

Schema migration (idempotent):
  ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS totp_backup_codes TEXT
2026-04-14 04:24:54 +02:00