Removed at the owner's request, entirely rather than switched off: the route's
allow-list, anonymous identity and flag lookup; the client's entry path, the
authFetch exception that let four endpoints out without an account, and the
workspace guard; the CSS, the in-page note, the admin flag and its save/load;
the test file and the assertions elsewhere that pinned it. Both settings rows
are deleted from app_settings.
Two things were checked rather than assumed on the way out. Removing the
anonymous identity collapsed every `if (!req.user.preview)` branch to its
authenticated side, so image tools, audit logging and citation storage now run
unconditionally — which is what they did before preview existed. And the route's
gate went back to a bare router.use(authMiddleware), which on a /api mount gates
every path below it in server.js; it is scoped to /clinical-assistant again, the
guard test catches it either way.
Verified after deploy: signed out, status, examples and chat all refuse with
401; signed in, chat still answers with 8 sources; extensions, encounters,
documents and admin remain shut.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Dv6sqaY6Vq3ChZHMem3cnU
Citation quality
- A citation naming a source that never came back is never rendered as a
link, so it appears as plain text and nobody learns it happened. It is now
measured on the server, where the answer and the sources both exist, so it
is seen whether or not a browser rendered it.
- Four Prometheus counters feed a Grafana dashboard (Ped-AI Citation
Quality): answers, citations written, answers affected, and individual
unresolved markers. Only answers with at least one unresolved citation are
stored, with the question and the titles retrieval returned, so an operator
can judge whether retrieval came back thin or the model over-cited. Rows
expire after 30 days: this is a quality signal, not a transcript log.
- Both answer paths are covered. /chat/stream is normal; /chat is the
fallback the client uses when streaming fails, so auditing only the first
would have hidden exactly the answers produced under failure.
- The tracker is resolved on demand and allowed to be absent. Seven test
files load this route with a hand-built list of permitted imports, and
adding a hard dependency would mean editing all seven — and the eighth
written later would break. Observation must never be able to fail an
answer, so a missing module simply means no tracking.
- Metric registration reuses an already-registered counter, because this
module can legitimately load twice in one process.
SSO settings on mobile
- Six rows were laid out inline: flex with a 160px label and an input that
would not shrink, so on a phone the row was wider than the screen with
nothing to scroll and no way to reach the rest. They use .admin-row now,
which already stacks below 640px. Verified at 390px and 360px: nothing
off-screen, no sideways overflow.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Dv6sqaY6Vq3ChZHMem3cnU
With more than one admin, every setting in the panel was editable by all of
them — prompts, model policy, retrieval budgets, SMTP, email templates.
ADMIN_LOCKDOWN separates running the service from changing how it behaves.
It is an environment variable on purpose: a setting could be switched off by
the very admin it restrains, so lifting this needs host access and a restart.
The server is the control. One gate refuses configuration writes rather than
a check in each of the fifteen write routes, because that list grows and a
route added later would quietly miss it. Reads always pass — lockdown hides
nothing. Day-to-day operation stays available: invitations, announcements,
registration, feature flags, and the test endpoints, which persist nothing.
A setting invented later is locked until someone deliberately makes it
editable, rather than defaulting to open.
The panel disables what it cannot save and says why, but that is courtesy;
the refusal is what enforces it.
Two things this taught me, both fixed: my first version painted the panel
from an IIFE, which the module conventions forbid, and fetched the whole
config a second time just to read one flag — breaking the test that pins
admin loaders firing exactly once. The state now rides on the invites
response the panel already requests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Dv6sqaY6Vq3ChZHMem3cnU
registration_enabled was a single switch: open to anyone, or closed to
everyone. This adds the setting an operator actually wants in between — open
to people you invited.
A code is single-use, expires (7 days by default, 90 maximum), and can be
revoked or deleted. It is stored hashed with only its last four characters
kept, because an invite grants account creation and a database dump should
not hand someone a working one. The code is readable exactly once, in the
response that creates it.
The claim is a single conditional UPDATE carrying every condition, so two
registrations racing the same code cannot both succeed. It happens after the
account exists, so a code is never spent on a failed registration — and if
the race is lost, the just-created account is removed rather than left behind
as a free registration. The rejection never says which of the four reasons
applied; distinguishing them would tell someone probing codes which guesses
were closer.
Codes avoid I, L, O and U so they survive being read aloud or copied off a
screen, and matching ignores case and separators.
The sign-up field appears only when the server says a code is required. The
admin card creates, lists, revokes and deletes, and carries the toggle.
Verified against the live database: create, claim, second claim refused,
unknown code refused, revoking a used code refused, delete. 684 tests pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Dv6sqaY6Vq3ChZHMem3cnU
It documented 18 of 67, so anyone setting up a deployment had to find the
rest by reading source — including CORS_ORIGINS, REDIS_URL, NODE_ENV and the
whole Clinical Assistant retrieval group. Each entry now shows the default
the code falls back to, so an unset line reads as "this default" rather than
"broken".
Also documents the OpenBao switch: the entrypoint only fetches secrets when
OPENBAO_ADDR is set, a compose or env_file value always beats the OpenBao
copy, and turning it off means unsetting that one variable and putting the
keys here — with the command to list the key names without printing values.
A test now derives the set of variables from source, so this cannot drift
again.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Dv6sqaY6Vq3ChZHMem3cnU
Three S3 configurations had grown separately — S3_* for documents,
GENERATED_IMAGES_S3_* for images, and AUDIO_BACKUPS_S3_* after them — with
different key names and their own client construction. That is why moving
storage meant hunting through several files.
src/utils/objectStorage.js now resolves settings for any purpose: its own
variables first, then the shared S3_* ones, with a per-purpose bucket name
(S3_BUCKET_AUDIO_BACKUPS). One endpoint plus three bucket names is enough
for the whole app, and a purpose that needs its own account still overrides
everything. Audio backups and documents use it; generated images keeps its
own tested storage module, whose variable names the resolver already
understands.
Nothing existing has to change: S3_ACCESS_KEY_ID, S3_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY and
the AWS_* fallbacks still resolve, and path-style addressing keeps each
purpose's previous default — off for documents, so a Backblaze endpoint
behaves as before, on where a custom endpoint implies MinIO. A _FILE
credential now always beats an inline one, so a mounted secret cannot be
shadowed by an inherited environment variable.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Dv6sqaY6Vq3ChZHMem3cnU
- adminMilestones was reached only because adminConfig is mounted on
/api/admin ahead of it and guards the whole path. adminMiddleware checks
req.user.role and nothing else, so it failed closed (403) rather than
open — but on mount order, not intent. It now states the requirement,
with a test covering all four admin routers.
- TODO.md records the whole audit: what was verified working (live
transcription round trip, voice mode wiring), what was fixed, the two
advisories that are unreachable and why, and the CI/CD and Kubernetes
work worth doing before scaling out.
Security review found nothing else exploitable: parameterised SQL
throughout (the one interpolated table name is allowlisted), CORS refuses
to start open in production, JWT_SECRET refuses to start unset in
production, rate limits on /api and each auth route, a real CSP, and no
secrets in the repo.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Dv6sqaY6Vq3ChZHMem3cnU
