pdf-quiz-generator/backend/alembic/versions/p5f6a7b8c9d0_refresh_tokens.py
Daniel e72cdd6716 feat: a versioned API, refresh tokens, and an end-to-end stack that found four bugs
**The API.** Every route now lives under `/api/v1`, with `/api/...` rewritten
onto it — one route, two spellings, so they cannot drift and the OpenAPI
document describes each endpoint once. Errors carry an `error` object with a
stable code, one human sentence and, for a validation failure, the fields that
were wrong; `detail` is untouched so nothing that reads it breaks. The whole
surface — 320 routes, their parameters and their status codes — is checked in
as `backend/tests/api-contract.json`, and a test fails on any difference,
naming the routes that moved. `docs/api.md` is the contract in prose.

**Refresh tokens**, so an app can stay signed in without keeping a password.
Rows rather than signatures: listable, withdrawable, stored as hashes, rotated
on every use. A spent token coming back ends the whole session, because a theft
and a replay look identical from the server and the safe reading is the unsafe
one. A browser is not given one — it has nowhere to put it and a person to ask.

**An end-to-end stack**: `docker-compose.test.yml` with its own Postgres and
Redis, `e2e/seed.py` for the smallest world the tests name, and Playwright with
five projects — desktop, iPhone, Pixel, iPad and a browserless API project.
Devices because every bug reported this week was a phone bug found by a person
looking at a screenshot; a desktop-only suite would have passed through all of
them. Forty tests, five clean runs.

It found four things in its first hour:

- **A fresh deploy could not start.** `create_all()` ran before
  `CREATE EXTENSION vector`, so any database that had never had pgvector
  installed died on the first table with a vector column. Invisible here
  because this one has had the extension for a year.
- **A figure in a published article was a 404 for everyone but an admin.**
  Media in the library is nobody's to read by default, and nothing made an
  exception for a drawing an article actually shows — so every illustration
  added this week was an empty box for every real user.
- **Every rate limit was one bucket for the whole site.** The backend saw
  nginx's address for every request, so ten bad passwords from anybody locked
  out everybody, and no log line could say who. nginx now takes the real
  address from the proxy and overwrites the header on the way in; uvicorn runs
  with --proxy-headers.
- **The reading page's breakpoints disagreed** — 1150px in the component,
  820px in the stylesheet. Between them the menu button claimed the contents
  drawer and then toggled a class on a rail that was still in the layout: the
  contents did not open and the site menu did not either. The button was dead
  on every tablet.

And two smaller ones: the login limiter counted successful sign-ins, so eleven
people behind one hospital NAT locked each other out — it is cleared by a
correct password now; and `/uploads/{path}` served GET and HEAD from one route
with one operation id, which makes every OpenAPI client generator refuse the
document.

The first admin's password is generated and printed once at first start when
`DEFAULT_ADMIN_PASSWORD` is blank, rather than the account not existing:
`docker compose logs backend | grep -A3 "FIRST ADMIN"`.

CI (`.forgejo/workflows/tests.yml`) runs the backend suite, the contract, the
frontend suite and the build on every push to dev, main or master, and the
end-to-end stack on those branches and on pull requests into them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TqXevQJhxFrM7jJg82cgZN
2026-09-13 01:23:38 +02:00

48 lines
2 KiB
Python

"""Refresh tokens, so an app can stay signed in without keeping a password
An access token here is a signed statement good for a day, and nothing
consults a table before believing it — so it cannot be withdrawn, and a client
that needs to survive longer than a day has only the password to fall back on.
A phone must never keep that.
A refresh token is a row instead of a signature: listable, withdrawable, and
stored as a hash so a leaked database does not hand over live sessions. Rotated
on every use, with the whole family withdrawn if a spent one comes back.
Revision ID: p5f6a7b8c9d0
Revises: n4e5f6a7b8c9
"""
import sqlalchemy as sa
from alembic import op
revision = "p5f6a7b8c9d0"
down_revision = "n4e5f6a7b8c9"
branch_labels = None
depends_on = None
def upgrade() -> None:
if "refresh_tokens" in sa.inspect(op.get_bind()).get_table_names():
return
op.create_table(
"refresh_tokens",
sa.Column("id", sa.Integer(), primary_key=True),
sa.Column("user_id", sa.Integer(), sa.ForeignKey("users.id", ondelete="CASCADE"), nullable=False),
sa.Column("token_hash", sa.String(length=64), nullable=False),
sa.Column("family", sa.String(length=32), nullable=False),
sa.Column("label", sa.String(length=120)),
sa.Column("created_at", sa.DateTime(), server_default=sa.func.now()),
sa.Column("expires_at", sa.DateTime(), nullable=False),
sa.Column("used_at", sa.DateTime()),
sa.Column("revoked_at", sa.DateTime()),
sa.Column("last_ip", sa.String(length=64)),
)
# Unique, because presenting a token is a lookup by its hash and two rows
# with the same hash would be two answers to one question.
op.create_index("ix_refresh_tokens_token_hash", "refresh_tokens", ["token_hash"], unique=True)
op.create_index("ix_refresh_tokens_user_id", "refresh_tokens", ["user_id"])
op.create_index("ix_refresh_tokens_family", "refresh_tokens", ["family"])
def downgrade() -> None:
op.drop_table("refresh_tokens")