The account settings offered "Change password", and there is no password
to change: accounts live at PedsHub SSO, which is also where a passkey,
an address or a second factor is set. A form that writes a credential
nothing checks is worse than no form — it invites somebody to secure
their account by a route that does not secure it. The panel now keeps
the display name and points at the provider for the rest.
Retired with it: GET /auth/verify-email, POST /auth/resend-verification,
POST /auth/forgot-password, POST /auth/reset-password, the new_password
branch of PUT /auth/me, the two schemas behind them, and the three pages
— VerifyEmailPage, ForgotPasswordPage, ResetPasswordPage — with their
routes and the links into them. An account with no password cannot
forget one.
POST /auth/login stays, still refused while sso_only is set. It is the
way back in if the provider is ever unreachable, together with the
DEFAULT_ADMIN_EMAIL seed at startup, and removing it would leave no door
at all on a bad day. The test that walked five password doors now walks
that one and asserts the other four answer 404 rather than 403 — gone,
not guarded.
Verified live: all four endpoints 404, and the account panel shows a
name field and "Manage your account ↗" to
sso.pedshub.com/if/user/#/settings, with no password field anywhere.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TqXevQJhxFrM7jJg82cgZN
Gone: /auth/register, /auth/signup-policy, POST /admin/users, the
RegisterPage, the register half of the landing modal, the Register
button, the "Sign up" link, the "Create an account" hero button, and the
UserCreate schema. /register redirects to /login for anybody holding a
bookmark. A first admin on a fresh install still comes from
DEFAULT_ADMIN_EMAIL at startup, so nothing is locked out.
And no flash of the old way in. Both sign-in surfaces defaulted to "no
provider" and drew the email form while /auth/sso/config was in flight,
then swapped it — so a reload showed a form that does not exist, briefly,
every time. They render nothing until the answer arrives. The landing
modal is now one button, "Sign in with PedsHub SSO", with no sentence
under it: the button already says where you are going.
Also, the section strip takes the width it has. It sat inside the 1200px
measure that keeps an article readable, so on a wide desktop the last
entries fell off the end and a scroll arrow appeared beside acres of
empty space. Verified at 1280, 1600 and 1920: ten links, no arrows.
And "Make a deck" comes out of the strip and the phone menu — that was
an over-reach on my part. The landing CTA keeps it, pointing at
app.pedshub.com/#resources, which is what was actually asked for.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TqXevQJhxFrM7jJg82cgZN
Both were this app doing an identity provider's work. Sign-in and
sign-up happen at sso.pedshub.com now: it takes the address, sends the
code, checks it, and knows about second factors — none of which belongs
here, and two of which were never done here at all.
Gone: services/invites.py, services/login_codes.py,
routers/login_code.py, the two models, the three admin invite routes,
the invite_only flag and its switch, the invite field on both sign-up
forms, and the code half of the sign-in page — which was the primary way
in and is now a button that says "Sign in with PedsHub SSO". The
password form stays for a site with no provider configured.
Migration r7b8c9d0e1f2 drops invite_codes (three spent rows) and
login_codes (empty). The dump beside it has both.
585 tests, and the contract snapshot is 320 routes — five fewer, all
five named in the diff so the removal is reviewable rather than
discovered later by a client.
Also: "Make a deck" in the signed-in menu and on the landing page, going
to the scribe's My Resources at app.pedshub.com/#resources. Same
sign-in on both sides; the arrow says it leaves.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TqXevQJhxFrM7jJg82cgZN
Two findings from a security pass on the SSO path, both real.
sso_only gated login and the login codes and nothing else. Register,
forgot-password, reset-password, resend-verification and setting a
password through PUT /auth/me all went through — so a site running
single sign-on could still mint a password account nobody vetted, and if
the flag were ever turned off, there it would be. One helper, five doors,
403 with a reason at each.
And the access token travelled in a query string. The SSO redirect is a
page load, so the browser asked nginx for /sso-callback?token=<a live
bearer token, good for a day> and nginx logs the request line — every
sign-in wrote one into the frontend container's access log, the
browser's history, and the Referer of whatever loaded next. It carries a
one-time code now: a random 32 bytes parked in Redis for sixty seconds,
traded at POST /auth/sso/exchange for the token, and deleted as it is
read, so a code replayed from any of those places buys nothing.
Also the OIDC state cookie, which is what stops an authorization
response being replayed at you: same_site lax (strict drops it on the
provider's top-level GET and fails every sign-in) and secure whenever
APP_URL is https.
And one cross, not two. The header's menu button is already a cross
while a drawer is open, so the drawer's own close button was a second
control an inch below it for the same job — gone from the article, the
player and the review.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TqXevQJhxFrM7jJg82cgZN
**The API.** Every route now lives under `/api/v1`, with `/api/...` rewritten
onto it — one route, two spellings, so they cannot drift and the OpenAPI
document describes each endpoint once. Errors carry an `error` object with a
stable code, one human sentence and, for a validation failure, the fields that
were wrong; `detail` is untouched so nothing that reads it breaks. The whole
surface — 320 routes, their parameters and their status codes — is checked in
as `backend/tests/api-contract.json`, and a test fails on any difference,
naming the routes that moved. `docs/api.md` is the contract in prose.
**Refresh tokens**, so an app can stay signed in without keeping a password.
Rows rather than signatures: listable, withdrawable, stored as hashes, rotated
on every use. A spent token coming back ends the whole session, because a theft
and a replay look identical from the server and the safe reading is the unsafe
one. A browser is not given one — it has nowhere to put it and a person to ask.
**An end-to-end stack**: `docker-compose.test.yml` with its own Postgres and
Redis, `e2e/seed.py` for the smallest world the tests name, and Playwright with
five projects — desktop, iPhone, Pixel, iPad and a browserless API project.
Devices because every bug reported this week was a phone bug found by a person
looking at a screenshot; a desktop-only suite would have passed through all of
them. Forty tests, five clean runs.
It found four things in its first hour:
- **A fresh deploy could not start.** `create_all()` ran before
`CREATE EXTENSION vector`, so any database that had never had pgvector
installed died on the first table with a vector column. Invisible here
because this one has had the extension for a year.
- **A figure in a published article was a 404 for everyone but an admin.**
Media in the library is nobody's to read by default, and nothing made an
exception for a drawing an article actually shows — so every illustration
added this week was an empty box for every real user.
- **Every rate limit was one bucket for the whole site.** The backend saw
nginx's address for every request, so ten bad passwords from anybody locked
out everybody, and no log line could say who. nginx now takes the real
address from the proxy and overwrites the header on the way in; uvicorn runs
with --proxy-headers.
- **The reading page's breakpoints disagreed** — 1150px in the component,
820px in the stylesheet. Between them the menu button claimed the contents
drawer and then toggled a class on a rail that was still in the layout: the
contents did not open and the site menu did not either. The button was dead
on every tablet.
And two smaller ones: the login limiter counted successful sign-ins, so eleven
people behind one hospital NAT locked each other out — it is cleared by a
correct password now; and `/uploads/{path}` served GET and HEAD from one route
with one operation id, which makes every OpenAPI client generator refuse the
document.
The first admin's password is generated and printed once at first start when
`DEFAULT_ADMIN_PASSWORD` is blank, rather than the account not existing:
`docker compose logs backend | grep -A3 "FIRST ADMIN"`.
CI (`.forgejo/workflows/tests.yml`) runs the backend suite, the contract, the
frontend suite and the build on every push to dev, main or master, and the
end-to-end stack on those branches and on pull requests into them.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TqXevQJhxFrM7jJg82cgZN
The moderator-only UI was hidden from moderators. `/auth/me` never returned
`is_moderator`, and the whole frontend decides what to show by reading it —
which is why "Draft with AI" appeared to do nothing: the panel was never
rendered for the person who owns the button.
AI Mode, from the reports alongside it:
- An empty answer was stored and drawn as a blank card. Both the empty reply
and the reply that is empty once an invented citation is deleted are now
refused before anything is written, so the question comes back in the box
with a reason. Old blank cards render an "Ask again" instead of nothing.
- The model narrated its own retrieval — how many sources it had seen, what it
could go and fetch — when asked for more questions than it could cite. It is
now told to name what there is in one sentence and stop.
- A thread took its name from the learner's raw typing, so the rail read "hi,
how do i treat a febrile seizure?". Openers are trimmed, "i" is a capital,
and the cut falls on a word.
- A cited article opened somewhere else. It now gets the same hover card as a
cross-reference in prose — excerpt, new tab, and the pane beside the answer.
- A built session said "questions ready" with no number: the endpoint returns
`count`, not `questions_count`.
And a race the last of those exposed: the guard that stops the transcript
being fetched over an answer that has just arrived was cleared as soon as the
request finished, so whether the exchange survived depended on when React ran
the effect. It now tracks which thread is on screen.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TqXevQJhxFrM7jJg82cgZN
Single sign-on wrote a random string nobody would ever know. That reads as
"has a password" to everything that asks — so Settings demanded a current
password before it would let those accounts set their first, and the only way
through was to click "forgot password" for a password they never had. The same
trap was waiting for anybody who only ever signs in with a code.
Null says the true thing. Signing in refuses an account with no password the
way it refuses a wrong one, because which accounts have one is not a question
that endpoint answers. Setting a first password asks for no current one;
changing an existing password still does. `/auth/me` reports whether there is
one at all and nothing about it, because Settings has to choose between "Set a
password" and "Change password" and cannot tell from the outside.
The random strings already written are left alone. They are unguessable, so
nothing can sign in with them, and clearing them would mean deciding from
outside which accounts were meant to have one.
Identity is the email address throughout, so the three ways in are three ways
into the same account: single sign-on, a code, or a password — and a person may
acquire or drop the third at any point without losing the other two.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TqXevQJhxFrM7jJg82cgZN
A password is a thing to remember and a thing to lose. Somebody who can read
their own mail can now sign in without one: ask, receive six characters, type
them into the page that is already open.
A code rather than a link, and the difference is not cosmetic. The token in a
link was 256 bits, unguessable however long it lived, so its length, its expiry
and its rate limit were three independent decisions. Six characters is 2^30,
and the three stop being independent — so they are argued together:
* six characters of the invite alphabet, imported rather than copied, because
there should be one answer to which characters a person may be asked to
retype and that one already drops O/0 and I/1;
* a code answers five guesses and is then retired, not slowed — whoever is
typing has lost the mail or does not own it, and both are one click from a
new one;
* one code live per person, since several would mean one guess tested against
all of them;
* ten verify attempts per address per fifteen minutes, so nobody buys five
fresh guesses at a time by asking again.
Tens of guesses an hour against a billion, and the victim gets a mail for every
code burned. Eight characters would buy a thousandfold against an attack the
guess budget has already ended, and cost every person two more characters.
The attempt count lives in the row, not the cache. The Redis limiter fails open
when Redis is down, which is right for what it usually guards and wrong for the
only thing standing between a patient stranger and six characters.
Verifying is scoped to the address. A short code looked up on its own would be
tried against every code live on the site at once — the short code's one real
weakness, closed by knowing whose code it should be before comparing.
Fifteen minutes, because a first mail between strangers is routinely greylisted
five to ten and a code that expires before it arrives is not a sign-in method.
Shortening it buys nothing: one code is live and it answers five guesses
however long it sits there.
Nothing distinguishes an address with an account from one without — same
message, same status, same duration, and both rate limits counted before the
account is looked up, so a 429 cannot become the tell. Redis keys are
fingerprints, and the table holds a fingerprint rather than the code.
SSO stays first where it is configured, and a password is still one click away
for anybody who has one.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TqXevQJhxFrM7jJg82cgZN
Three things landed together; the message names all of them, because a commit
that mentions one is a commit nobody finds the other two in.
**Figures.** Thirty-four JPEG 2000 files — 21 on questions, the rest unattached
in the media library — are WebP now, with `questions.image_path`,
`questions.explanation_image_path` and `media_assets.path` repointed together.
Serving already converted them on the way out, so nothing was broken; this
removes the step and makes what is stored the same thing that is served. The
originals stay: they are the only copy of what came out of the PDF, they cost a
few megabytes between them, and a conversion nobody can undo is not one to run
against a live bank. Paths are found by what the columns say rather than by
listing a bucket, because three tables record them and updating two would be
worse than none.
**The openai SDK is gone.** Ten call sites — one more than the map said, the
Celery article drafter — every one of them a POST with a JSON body, and not one
reading usage, cost, tool calls or logprobs. Every other call to the same proxy
was already plain httpx: embeddings, the ChromaDB embedding function, speech
both ways, model discovery, the vision probe. So this deletes an abstraction
rather than swapping one for another, and leaves one HTTP client instead of
two. `chat()` and `achat()` return the message content; a `ProxyError` carries
the status and the first 500 characters of the body, which is where the proxy
explains itself.
Behaviour is preserved deliberately, including a 600-second fallback timeout
for the four call sites that were running on the SDK's ten-minute default.
Lowering that is a real change and belongs in its own commit.
Proved against the live proxy on both services rather than only against mocks:
a completion, an async completion, a real 400 the vision probe still classifies
as a refusal, 407 models read from the catalogue, and a word read off an image.
**Voice.** A chosen voice is honoured whatever serves it. The prefix check only
accepted a locally served one, so a site adding a hosted voice would offer it
in Settings, save the learner's choice, and then quietly read every question in
the default voice. The list has always come from the database — adding a voice
is a row in Settings → AI models, never a code change.
And the sign-in page stops offering a locked door: `signup-policy` reports
whether registration is open at all, and the Sign up link goes when it is not.
The switch existed and the only way to discover it was to fill the form in.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TqXevQJhxFrM7jJg82cgZN
The incomplete-block warning is the one from the screenshot: a red
heading that says the block is incomplete, the count of unanswered items,
the sentence about resuming not matching exam day, and End Block against
Remain in Block. My version asked the question in my own words and led
with the wrong button.
Pausing says "Exam Paused" and offers Return to exam. Nothing else — the
warning about real exams is somebody else's disclaimer, not ours.
Exit session asks "Are you sure you want to end this session?" before it
goes, rather than going.
Time's Up says what it is and the button says Close, which is the only
thing left to do: it is already handed in and marked, and Close lands on
the session's analysis.
One name for one action: the bottom button read Skip on an unanswered
question and Next on an answered one, while the arrow an inch above it
said Next for both.
And the rail shows stems again once the block is handed in. Numbers while
it is being sat — reading ahead is not something the exam being rehearsed
allows — but there is nothing left to protect afterwards, so the review
reads like study mode.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TqXevQJhxFrM7jJg82cgZN
The quiz player is a box the height of the window. The question used to
scroll the whole page, which took the session rail and the navigation off
screen exactly when you wanted them; now each column scrolls on its own
and the bar — Exit session, Previous, Next, Review — stays put.
Two site-wide switches, together under Settings → Site policy because
both are the administrator's and both apply to everyone:
* Sharing can be turned off. That stops new links being made; one
already handed to somebody keeps working, since revoking it would
break something a learner has already given away.
* Sign-up can be made invite-only, with single-use codes carrying a
note of who each is for and, afterwards, who it let in. A spent code
is kept rather than deleted — that record is the point of invite-only.
The alphabet has no O/0 or I/1/l, because these get read aloud.
The registration form asks for a code only when the site needs one, via
an unauthenticated policy endpoint — it has to know before there is an
account to ask with. It never says whether a given code is valid before
the account exists, which would make it somewhere to guess them. The
first account is always allowed, or a new install would lock itself out
before an administrator existed to issue a code.
Flags fall back to their defaults when Redis is down, in the safe
direction each way: sharing keeps working, sign-up does not silently
open.
Found on the way: the registration form's three labels named nothing —
no `for`, no wrapping — so a screen reader announced unlabelled boxes.
Backend 261/261, frontend 328/328.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TqXevQJhxFrM7jJg82cgZN
Remove the challenge from standalone and landing login plus backend verification; retain registration/contact protection and existing password, email verification, SSO and login rate-limit checks. Verified 18 backend tests in deployed image and 17 frontend tests plus build.
- FastAPI backend with JWT auth, roles (admin/moderator/user)
- PDF upload (up to 500MB) with streaming, PyMuPDF text extraction
- ChromaDB vectorization per page with metadata
- LiteLLM AI question extraction from PDF (not generation)
- Image extraction from PDF pages, graceful fallback
- Quiz modes: timed (countdown timer) + learning (answers shown inline)
- Page-by-page question navigation with dot navigator
- TTS endpoint using LiteLLM (Google Vertex / OpenAI voices)
- Admin dashboard: AI model management per task, user role management
- Moderator role: upload PDFs, create sections, generate quizzes
- Spaced repetition reminders via SMTP email (SM-2 intervals)
- APScheduler daily reminder jobs
- Celery + Redis for background PDF processing
- React frontend with all pages
- Docker Compose deployment (nginx + backend + celery + redis)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
