_session_limits still called the session budget the backstop for code that
computes, which stopped being true when the pool gained a request_timeout in the
same commit. The watchdog kills such a call at code_timeout, so it can never
spend a budget of code_timeout * max_executions. The docstring now names the two
per-call limits and claims neither.
The crash test said the discard prevents a RuntimeError escaping execute(). The
handler catches RuntimeError too, so without the discard every later call
returns a failed result instead.
Name MemoryFile's missing write hook as the reason metadata.json takes a reader
and a deny pair. Drop the clause in the CHANGELOG that narrated how the old
overrun accumulated.
The pool watchdog counts only the time a worker spends running code, so a read
that blocks the worker never trips it. The margin above code_timeout therefore
guarded a race that cannot happen, and only bought a runaway call 90s where 60s
was configured. Pass code_timeout straight through. The two limits are disjoint:
the watchdog bounds a call that computes, and the read deadline bounds a call
that reads.
Drop the ordering test, which was true for any positive margin. The containment
test no longer sets code_timeout to zero, because that value now also disables
the watchdog and kills the worker before the read guard can refuse. It patches
the guard instead.
Monty 0.0.19 runs a plain class and a class with __enter__ and __exit__. Only
inheritance and metaclasses raise. Say that in the instructions.
MemoryFile is no longer constructed, so drop the import, the annotation, and the
stale references in the sandbox docstring and CLAUDE.md. That CLAUDE.md line
also still claimed a ThreadPoolExecutor, _run_async, and a fresh interpreter per
call.
The read deadline only gets control at a read, so code that computes without
reading escaped it. Give the pool a request_timeout above code_timeout. The
watchdog kills the worker, and execute() already replaces a dead session, so a
runaway call fails and the next call recovers. A read refusal keeps the
variables, so it has to win the race whenever code does read.
Restore test_open_file_objects_are_not_iterable. Replacing the neighbouring
write test by text range deleted it, which left the instructions carrying a
prohibition with nothing to signal when monty lifts it.
Reuse the VFS and the pool when a session is replaced, so recovery skips the
document scan. Mount metadata.json with a lambda rather than a factory. Cover
open() in write mode. Fold the crash entry into the pydantic-monty bullet,
because no release shipped the worker without it.
A crashed worker used to poison the rest of the run. execute() reported the
crash as a failed result, but kept the dead session, and every later call then
raised RuntimeError out of the tool. Clear the session so the next call checks
out a replacement. Keep the session for a syntax or runtime error, which leaves
the worker healthy, and say in the failure text that a restart loses the
variables.
A MemoryFile accepts writes, so metadata.json took them while the other three
document files refused. Mount it through the same read and deny pair. The
write-denial test now covers all four files.
The VFS bridge suspends the Monty worker for the length of a read. Monty checks
its duration budget between interpreter steps, so it cannot check while a read
is in flight. Code that reads in a loop overran a 60s budget by minutes. A read
takes about 20ms on a 2789-document corpus, so a full scan spends about 55s in
reads alone.
Check the deadline before each read. Raising from inside the callback answers the
worker's suspension, which keeps the session usable.
Monty also spends max_duration_secs across the session rather than per call, and
the sandbox reuses the session so that variables persist. Budget it for
code_timeout * max_executions. At the old per-call value the first slow call
starved every later one.
Do not wrap feed_run in asyncio.wait_for. Cancelling during pure compute is
clean, but cancelling while a read waits for an answer wedges the session with a
protocol RuntimeError that escapes execute(). A call that computes without
reading stays bounded by the session budget alone.
Monty 0.0.19 supports open() and with blocks, but a file object is still not
iterable. See pydantic/monty#490, which is still open. The instructions now
state the limitation in three places and give the alternative next to each
one: readlines() or read().split("\n").
Replace chr(10) with "\n" in the prose and in the example. Both work on
0.0.19, and chr(10) implies that the escape is broken.
Add a test that pins the limitation. The test fails when Monty gains
iteration support, which is the signal to relax the instructions.
Document files can be read with open() and with-blocks (.read(),
.readline(), .readlines()); writes raise PermissionError. File objects
remain non-iterable and the collections module is still unavailable.
0.0.19 runs sandboxed code in a subprocess worker pool (AsyncMonty /
AsyncMontySession) and drops MontyRepl. The sandbox checks out a session,
drives it with feed_run, and closes it to return the worker; close() is
now async. Worker crashes surface as a failed SandboxResult. The document
VFS (OSAccess/CallbackFile/MemoryFile) is unchanged.
Drop the coverage-gate CHANGELOG entry: it is dev infrastructure, invisible
to anyone upgrading. Broaden the check_source_accessible entry to the cases
it now covers.
The nameless-attachment guard reads an empty /F out of untrusted PDF bytes,
so it is boundary validation, not a formality; only the reason it goes
uncovered belongs in the pragma.
check_source_accessible narrowed its handler to ValueError, but Path.exists
re-raises errno values outside its ignored set (EACCES, ENAMETOOLONG). Those
were swallowed before and now escaped into the rebuild sweep the guard exists
to protect. Catch OSError too.
Restore the arity guard in _common_path_prefix: without it an empty list
raises from min() and a single label yields a prefix covering the whole path.
Two tests would have hung rather than failed on regression (the vacuum skip
and the protected-wait cancellation); both are now bounded. The import
vacuum test raced against the done-callback that discards the task, and now
spies on the call instead, with a negative control.
Replace assertions that could not fail: blank-query search against an empty
corpus, a batch flush counted against an empty table, a picture description
asserting its own input state, and an FS scheme check with nothing on disk to
resolve. The get_model matrix asserted only the returned type across 26
cases and now pins the per-provider settings. The three batching tests now
count flushes, which revealed embed-only writes through chunks_table.add
rather than _flush_rebuild_batch.
Cover the remaining paths in the client, context, downloads, title
generation, document tools and store models, and add fail_under=100 so
uncovered lines fail CI.
Six lines that no test can reach get a pragma with its reason: the docling
import guard, the nameless PDF attachment, the FS symlink OSError guard that
resolve(strict=False) absorbs, the docling bbox and LanceDB document-id
shape guards, the tag-retention branch vacuum makes unreachable, and Monty's
Rust-thread print callback.
Fix test_find_config_file_user_config, which wrote its config into the cwd it
had chdir'd to, so the cwd branch answered first and the user-directory
lookup it names was never exercised.
Add tests for the MCP tools' degradation contracts, malformed WebDAV
multistatus bodies, dry-run poller sweeps including the circuit-open and
discover-failure paths, FS source scheme and symlink handling, docling-serve
zip parsing, and the remaining embedding and reranker helpers. Parametrize
_strip_etag.
Drop the misplaced pragma on the analyze handler, which sat on the return and
left the except uncovered. Add one on the FS symlink OSError guard, which
resolve(strict=False) absorbs for every real link.
Delete repository methods with no callers (SettingsRepository CRUD,
ChunkRepository.update/delete/get_chunks_in_range), the DataFrame branch of
_process_search_results whose only caller always passes a query, and guards
that cannot be reached from their call sites: the rebuild mode=None default,
the staging drop already performed by _resolve_rebuild_recovery, the empty
batch skip, two context fast paths, the doctor prefix guard, the poller
_task attribute that is never assigned, and a docling caption fallback for
a field name no item class defines.
set_haiku_version built a recreated settings row from the process-global
Config rather than the store's own, so a store opened with a custom config
stamped global settings into the database.
check_source_accessible called urlparse outside its try block, so a stored
URI with a malformed IPv6 host raised ValueError instead of reporting the
source as inaccessible, aborting the whole rebuild sweep.
ChatApp and InspectorApp assigned self.client before __aenter__
completed, so a failed open was masked by an AttributeError from
on_unmount tearing down the never-opened client.
Drive analysis-only chat with analysis.model (falling back to qa.model) so
the running model matches the one the analysis capability configures,
including its vision flag; RAG-bearing chats still run on qa.model.
Give the AG-UI example state-bearing deps and a final STATE_SNAPSHOT so
registered citations reach the client, mirroring the app backend.
Update chat docs: haiku-rag chat uses --capability/-c, and drop the removed
"View state" command-palette entry.
reranking.multimodal (vllm provider only) attaches picture bytes to
synthetic picture chunks before rerank; VLLMReranker sends them as
content-parts documents (base64 data URI + description text) in the
same /v1/rerank request as plain text documents.
Docling guesses a DocumentStream's format from its first bytes before
considering the extension, so markdown/HTML content starting with a binary
magic signature ("BM" = BMP, "ID3" = MP3) was routed to an image or audio
backend and fell back to plain-text conversion. Prefix the encoded text
with a newline so the sniff finds nothing and the extension decides.
visualize_chunk re-expanded chunks from scratch to recover their refs,
which could not faithfully reproduce the original merge, scores, and
clip — so a visualization could highlight different pages than the
citation covered. Carry the cited items on Citation.doc_item_refs and
resolve bounding boxes from them directly; re-expansion remains only as
the fallback for callers with no stored context (CLI, inspector). Chat,
inspector, the app endpoint, and the frontend pass the refs through.
A merged search result took its chunk_id from whichever constituent
sorted earliest in the document, while its score was the max across the
group — so the citation's identity could point at a different, less
relevant chunk. Anchor chunk_id and the content/refs fallbacks on the
max-score constituent, clip the budget window around that same chunk so
its evidence is never trimmed away, and narrow page_numbers, doc_item_refs,
and attached image bytes to the items that survive the clip.
When a docling-serve instance crashes or returns 5xx, DoclingServeClient now
retries the request on a different instance (up to max_attempts) and trips a
per-instance circuit breaker so subsequent jobs skip a dead instance until its
cooldown elapses. Reuses the shared CircuitBreaker; adds max_attempts and a
nested circuit_breaker to providers.docling_serve.
Co-Authored-By: bryan davis <bryan@monkeytronics.org>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Relocate CircuitBreaker from ingester/pollers to haiku/rag/circuit_breaker
so non-ingester callers (docling-serve provider) can reuse it without
depending on the ingester package.
Co-Authored-By: bryan davis <bryan@monkeytronics.org>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Replace the seven repeated `config.reranking.model and ... == provider`
checks and six per-branch ImportError handlers with one None guard and one
try/except around the provider dispatch.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
