Sandbox.close released the pool and the held federated client only when
the monty session's __aexit__ returned. Each release now runs under
suppress(Exception), matching _discard_session and aclose_quietly, so a
raising step neither masks an unwinding error nor leaks the databases a
federated `_opened` holds.
`_fetch_limit` had no test: a text query over-fetches `limit * 10` only with a
reranker, and an image query keeps its vector ranking either way. The sandbox
test asserted `KeyError`, which `UnknownDatabaseError` subclasses, so it could
not tell the contract from a bare one.
`uses_configured_databases` documents a mapping of one as covered; the test
named for it passed no mapping at all. Its `config` parameter is an `AppConfig`.
`test_an_analysis_capability_mounts_the_configured_set` carried a VCR marker and
no cassette, making no HTTP calls.
The lock was applied to an owner as well, so every owner-backed file read queued
behind the capability's tool calls to guard state it does not touch. An owner is
a session of its own and is yielded straight through, which is what the
docstring already claimed.
`_documents` took its owner clients inside an ephemeral connection and used
them after that connection closed, then stored them for the file reads that
follow, so every standalone multi-database read went through a closed database.
A sandbox covering a set now retains the client it opened until `close()`. One
database has no owners and keeps its connection no longer than the read that
opened it, so a write from elsewhere is still visible to the next read.
Two files of 1,405 and 814 lines become seven: scope resolution, lifecycle,
search, documents, expansion, citations and capabilities. `_config`, `_seed`
and the rest move to `helpers.py`, importable by the sandbox tests that share
them, and the package points VCR back at `tests/cassettes/multi_db/`.
`resolve_db_path` manufactured the default path whenever `lancedb.databases`
was empty, and `covers_several_databases` read coverage back out of the
configuration, so a capability built without a client opened
`storage.data_dir/haiku.rag.lancedb` instead of what `lancedb.uri` placed.
The entry point resolves a `DatabaseScope` instead: instructions ask it what
it covers and `_ensure_rag` opens it through `HaikuRAG._covering`, so
coverage is decided once rather than encoded in a path and re-derived.
`Sandbox._covering` takes the scope the capability already resolved, beside
the public constructor that takes a path. The factory signatures are
unchanged.
`list_documents()` reached into the ownership map for a name the document
already carries. The map is still built, so a document id two databases
claim is still refused before anything mounts. A listing over one named
database now reports that name, as in-code `search()` already does.
covers_multiple, source_names, source and reader_for replace the private
state seven modules were reading to work out how many databases they had.
The configured selection is kept intact, so entering a client twice derives
the same database rather than the last derivation.
Chunk 2 gave search a configured set to fan out over. ask and analyze
covered one database still: the RAG capability had no way to be told which
databases a question spanned, and the analysis sandbox mounted one
document tree.
The selection travels as sources on EvidenceState, beside the filter it
scopes with, so both capabilities read it the same way. clients_covering
is the one rule that turns a selection into clients, used by search, the
sandbox mount and the cite fallback, so a question scoped to some
databases cannot search, mount or cite another. Citations carry the
database they came from, and format_for_agent names it, so the model can
attribute evidence while it answers rather than only afterwards.
The sandbox keeps one flat /documents/{id}/ namespace and resolves each id
to the client holding it, which rests on ids being UUID4. A database
copied from another breaks that, so an id held twice is refused rather
than resolved to whichever arrived last.
On the CLI, search, ask and analyze cover the configured set and label
each result with its database. Every other command works on one, named
with --database NAME (a name reaches a database behind a URI, which --db
cannot) or --db PATH, and refuses a set it cannot choose from instead of
silently reading the default database. Cold databases open together, so a
first query costs the slowest open rather than their sum.
_session_limits still called the session budget the backstop for code that
computes, which stopped being true when the pool gained a request_timeout in the
same commit. The watchdog kills such a call at code_timeout, so it can never
spend a budget of code_timeout * max_executions. The docstring now names the two
per-call limits and claims neither.
The crash test said the discard prevents a RuntimeError escaping execute(). The
handler catches RuntimeError too, so without the discard every later call
returns a failed result instead.
Name MemoryFile's missing write hook as the reason metadata.json takes a reader
and a deny pair. Drop the clause in the CHANGELOG that narrated how the old
overrun accumulated.
The pool watchdog counts only the time a worker spends running code, so a read
that blocks the worker never trips it. The margin above code_timeout therefore
guarded a race that cannot happen, and only bought a runaway call 90s where 60s
was configured. Pass code_timeout straight through. The two limits are disjoint:
the watchdog bounds a call that computes, and the read deadline bounds a call
that reads.
Drop the ordering test, which was true for any positive margin. The containment
test no longer sets code_timeout to zero, because that value now also disables
the watchdog and kills the worker before the read guard can refuse. It patches
the guard instead.
Monty 0.0.19 runs a plain class and a class with __enter__ and __exit__. Only
inheritance and metaclasses raise. Say that in the instructions.
MemoryFile is no longer constructed, so drop the import, the annotation, and the
stale references in the sandbox docstring and CLAUDE.md. That CLAUDE.md line
also still claimed a ThreadPoolExecutor, _run_async, and a fresh interpreter per
call.
The read deadline only gets control at a read, so code that computes without
reading escaped it. Give the pool a request_timeout above code_timeout. The
watchdog kills the worker, and execute() already replaces a dead session, so a
runaway call fails and the next call recovers. A read refusal keeps the
variables, so it has to win the race whenever code does read.
Restore test_open_file_objects_are_not_iterable. Replacing the neighbouring
write test by text range deleted it, which left the instructions carrying a
prohibition with nothing to signal when monty lifts it.
Reuse the VFS and the pool when a session is replaced, so recovery skips the
document scan. Mount metadata.json with a lambda rather than a factory. Cover
open() in write mode. Fold the crash entry into the pydantic-monty bullet,
because no release shipped the worker without it.
A crashed worker used to poison the rest of the run. execute() reported the
crash as a failed result, but kept the dead session, and every later call then
raised RuntimeError out of the tool. Clear the session so the next call checks
out a replacement. Keep the session for a syntax or runtime error, which leaves
the worker healthy, and say in the failure text that a restart loses the
variables.
A MemoryFile accepts writes, so metadata.json took them while the other three
document files refused. Mount it through the same read and deny pair. The
write-denial test now covers all four files.
The VFS bridge suspends the Monty worker for the length of a read. Monty checks
its duration budget between interpreter steps, so it cannot check while a read
is in flight. Code that reads in a loop overran a 60s budget by minutes. A read
takes about 20ms on a 2789-document corpus, so a full scan spends about 55s in
reads alone.
Check the deadline before each read. Raising from inside the callback answers the
worker's suspension, which keeps the session usable.
Monty also spends max_duration_secs across the session rather than per call, and
the sandbox reuses the session so that variables persist. Budget it for
code_timeout * max_executions. At the old per-call value the first slow call
starved every later one.
Do not wrap feed_run in asyncio.wait_for. Cancelling during pure compute is
clean, but cancelling while a read waits for an answer wedges the session with a
protocol RuntimeError that escapes execute(). A call that computes without
reading stays bounded by the session budget alone.
Monty 0.0.19 supports open() and with blocks, but a file object is still not
iterable. See pydantic/monty#490, which is still open. The instructions now
state the limitation in three places and give the alternative next to each
one: readlines() or read().split("\n").
Replace chr(10) with "\n" in the prose and in the example. Both work on
0.0.19, and chr(10) implies that the escape is broken.
Add a test that pins the limitation. The test fails when Monty gains
iteration support, which is the signal to relax the instructions.
Document files can be read with open() and with-blocks (.read(),
.readline(), .readlines()); writes raise PermissionError. File objects
remain non-iterable and the collections module is still unavailable.
0.0.19 runs sandboxed code in a subprocess worker pool (AsyncMonty /
AsyncMontySession) and drops MontyRepl. The sandbox checks out a session,
drives it with feed_run, and closes it to return the worker; close() is
now async. Worker crashes surface as a failed SandboxResult. The document
VFS (OSAccess/CallbackFile/MemoryFile) is unchanged.
Rewriting the document through client.update_document re-chunks and
re-embeds, so the test needed an embedding endpoint that CI does not have.
Write the row through the repository instead, matching how the rest of the
file avoids the embedder.
check_source_accessible narrowed its handler to ValueError, but Path.exists
re-raises errno values outside its ignored set (EACCES, ENAMETOOLONG). Those
were swallowed before and now escaped into the rebuild sweep the guard exists
to protect. Catch OSError too.
Restore the arity guard in _common_path_prefix: without it an empty list
raises from min() and a single label yields a prefix covering the whole path.
Two tests would have hung rather than failed on regression (the vacuum skip
and the protected-wait cancellation); both are now bounded. The import
vacuum test raced against the done-callback that discards the task, and now
spies on the call instead, with a negative control.
Replace assertions that could not fail: blank-query search against an empty
corpus, a batch flush counted against an empty table, a picture description
asserting its own input state, and an FS scheme check with nothing on disk to
resolve. The get_model matrix asserted only the returned type across 26
cases and now pins the per-provider settings. The three batching tests now
count flushes, which revealed embed-only writes through chunks_table.add
rather than _flush_rebuild_batch.
