analysis.code_timeout was enforced only in _run_on_loop, the bridge for
database-bound reads; metadata.json, the cached JSONL files and in-code
search() and list_documents() never looked at the clock, and Monty's
watchdog counts compute only. Every host call now checks the deadline
before it starts.
Host errors keep their message for every caller: the masking added for the
MCP server goes, and the sandbox is one path for the capability and the
server alike.
The execute_code description gains the toc.json node shape, the patterns
the evals put into the analysis instructions (one list_documents call to
map a title to an id, files carry no source, toc before search for a known
document, doc_item_refs are items self_refs, chunk ids join files and are
not citations) and the sandbox's read-only, no-network, time-limit and
output facts, which the analysis instructions now state too. The skill
gains pictures as images, image search when offered, and citing chunk
metadata locators. docs/mcp.md lists the interpreter's limits under Code.
pydantic-monty>=0.0.23 brings collections, itertools, functools,
dataclasses, function decorators and str.format into the sandbox; every
layer names the same modules, and a test imports them. Monty now caps host
callbacks per checkout at 1000 by default; the sandbox raises it out of
reach, since the time budgets govern.
In Claude Code the client is the model, so the server no longer runs one.
execute_code runs a Python program per call in the analysis sandbox over
the selected documents and returns what it printed; the sandbox is created
and closed per call so Monty's cumulative budget and a frozen mount never
outlive a program. --no-agents goes with the two tools, and format_citations
in haiku.rag.utils goes with its only caller.
The sandbox exposes chunk metadata to code: chunk_meta on search results,
metadata on list_documents rows and in metadata.json, and chunks.jsonl per
document. A host-side failure inside a program, a document read or an
in-code search raising, reaches the program by exception type only and is
logged with its traceback. recovery_hint moves to haiku.rag.sandbox.
Closes#604.
DatabaseRef is a name and a location. The configuration places databases
through lancedb.databases alone; with none configured the default is the
entry haiku.rag under storage.data_dir, selectable like any other.
lancedb.uri is removed, and a config carrying it fails to load with the
replacement spelled out. A path passed from Python is valid where the
configuration places nothing and raises AmbiguousDatabaseError beside
lancedb.databases; haiku-rag --db and haiku-ingester --db construct the
scope directly, so a human's override keeps working. Every database
answers to a name, and a database given as a path keeps its own errors.
Sandbox.close released the pool and the held federated client only when
the monty session's __aexit__ returned. Each release now runs under
suppress(Exception), matching _discard_session and aclose_quietly, so a
raising step neither masks an unwinding error nor leaks the databases a
federated `_opened` holds.
`list_documents()` reached into the ownership map for a name the document
already carries. The map is still built, so a document id two databases
claim is still refused before anything mounts. A listing over one named
database now reports that name, as in-code `search()` already does.
_session_limits still called the session budget the backstop for code that
computes, which stopped being true when the pool gained a request_timeout in the
same commit. The watchdog kills such a call at code_timeout, so it can never
spend a budget of code_timeout * max_executions. The docstring now names the two
per-call limits and claims neither.
The crash test said the discard prevents a RuntimeError escaping execute(). The
handler catches RuntimeError too, so without the discard every later call
returns a failed result instead.
Name MemoryFile's missing write hook as the reason metadata.json takes a reader
and a deny pair. Drop the clause in the CHANGELOG that narrated how the old
overrun accumulated.
The pool watchdog counts only the time a worker spends running code, so a read
that blocks the worker never trips it. The margin above code_timeout therefore
guarded a race that cannot happen, and only bought a runaway call 90s where 60s
was configured. Pass code_timeout straight through. The two limits are disjoint:
the watchdog bounds a call that computes, and the read deadline bounds a call
that reads.
Drop the ordering test, which was true for any positive margin. The containment
test no longer sets code_timeout to zero, because that value now also disables
the watchdog and kills the worker before the read guard can refuse. It patches
the guard instead.
Monty 0.0.19 runs a plain class and a class with __enter__ and __exit__. Only
inheritance and metaclasses raise. Say that in the instructions.
MemoryFile is no longer constructed, so drop the import, the annotation, and the
stale references in the sandbox docstring and CLAUDE.md. That CLAUDE.md line
also still claimed a ThreadPoolExecutor, _run_async, and a fresh interpreter per
call.
The read deadline only gets control at a read, so code that computes without
reading escaped it. Give the pool a request_timeout above code_timeout. The
watchdog kills the worker, and execute() already replaces a dead session, so a
runaway call fails and the next call recovers. A read refusal keeps the
variables, so it has to win the race whenever code does read.
Restore test_open_file_objects_are_not_iterable. Replacing the neighbouring
write test by text range deleted it, which left the instructions carrying a
prohibition with nothing to signal when monty lifts it.
Reuse the VFS and the pool when a session is replaced, so recovery skips the
document scan. Mount metadata.json with a lambda rather than a factory. Cover
open() in write mode. Fold the crash entry into the pydantic-monty bullet,
because no release shipped the worker without it.
A crashed worker used to poison the rest of the run. execute() reported the
crash as a failed result, but kept the dead session, and every later call then
raised RuntimeError out of the tool. Clear the session so the next call checks
out a replacement. Keep the session for a syntax or runtime error, which leaves
the worker healthy, and say in the failure text that a restart loses the
variables.
A MemoryFile accepts writes, so metadata.json took them while the other three
document files refused. Mount it through the same read and deny pair. The
write-denial test now covers all four files.
The VFS bridge suspends the Monty worker for the length of a read. Monty checks
its duration budget between interpreter steps, so it cannot check while a read
is in flight. Code that reads in a loop overran a 60s budget by minutes. A read
takes about 20ms on a 2789-document corpus, so a full scan spends about 55s in
reads alone.
Check the deadline before each read. Raising from inside the callback answers the
worker's suspension, which keeps the session usable.
Monty also spends max_duration_secs across the session rather than per call, and
the sandbox reuses the session so that variables persist. Budget it for
code_timeout * max_executions. At the old per-call value the first slow call
starved every later one.
Do not wrap feed_run in asyncio.wait_for. Cancelling during pure compute is
clean, but cancelling while a read waits for an answer wedges the session with a
protocol RuntimeError that escapes execute(). A call that computes without
reading stays bounded by the session budget alone.
Monty 0.0.19 supports open() and with blocks, but a file object is still not
iterable. See pydantic/monty#490, which is still open. The instructions now
state the limitation in three places and give the alternative next to each
one: readlines() or read().split("\n").
Replace chr(10) with "\n" in the prose and in the example. Both work on
0.0.19, and chr(10) implies that the escape is broken.
Add a test that pins the limitation. The test fails when Monty gains
iteration support, which is the signal to relax the instructions.
Document files can be read with open() and with-blocks (.read(),
.readline(), .readlines()); writes raise PermissionError. File objects
remain non-iterable and the collections module is still unavailable.
0.0.19 runs sandboxed code in a subprocess worker pool (AsyncMonty /
AsyncMontySession) and drops MontyRepl. The sandbox checks out a session,
drives it with feed_run, and closes it to return the worker; close() is
now async. Worker crashes surface as a failed SandboxResult. The document
VFS (OSAccess/CallbackFile/MemoryFile) is unchanged.
