CRITICAL security fixes for pulse-sensor-proxy:
1. Strengthened hostname validation regex:
- Now requires hostnames to start with alphanumeric character
- Prevents SSH option injection via hostnames starting with '-'
- Pattern: ^[a-zA-Z0-9][a-zA-Z0-9._-]{0,63}$ (1-64 chars total)
- Added IPv4 and IPv6 validation regexes for future use
2. Added validation to vulnerable V1 RPC handlers:
- handleGetTemperature: Now validates node parameter before SSH
- handleRegisterNodes: Now validates discovered cluster nodes
- Previously these handlers passed unsanitized input directly to SSH
3. Defense in depth:
- V2 handlers already had validation (now using improved regex)
- Multiple layers of protection against malicious node identifiers
- Validation prevents container from passing SSH options as hostnames
Without these fixes, a compromised container could potentially inject SSH
options by providing malicious node names, though the 'root@' prefix
provided some mitigation.
Addresses high-severity finding from security audit.
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| pulse | ||
| pulse-docker-agent | ||
| pulse-sensor-proxy | ||