Fix critical P0 security and crash issues in API/WebSocket layer
This commit addresses 5 critical P0 bugs that cause security vulnerabilities, crashes, and data corruption: **P0-1: Recovery Tokens Replay Attack Vulnerability** (recovery_tokens.go:153-159) - **SECURITY CRITICAL**: Single-use recovery tokens could be replayed - **Problem**: Lock upgrade race - two concurrent requests both pass initial Used check 1. Both acquire RLock, see token.Used = false 2. Both release RLock 3. Both acquire Lock and mark token.Used = true 4. Both return true - TOKEN REUSED - **Impact**: Attacker with intercepted token can use it multiple times - **Fix**: Re-check token.Used after acquiring write lock (TOCTOU prevention) **P0-2: WebSocket Hub Concurrent Map Panic** (hub.go:345-347, 376-378) - **Problem**: Initial state goroutine reads h.clients map without lock - Line 345: `if _, ok := h.clients[client]` (NO LOCK) - Main loop writes to h.clients with lock (line 326, 394) - **Impact**: "fatal error: concurrent map read and write" crashes hub - **Fix**: Acquire RLock before all client map reads in goroutine **P0-3: WebSocket Send on Closed Channel Panic** (hub.go:348, 380) - **Problem**: Check client exists, then send - channel can close between - **Impact**: "send on closed channel" panic crashes hub - **Fix**: Hold RLock during both check and send (defensive select already present) **P0-4: CSRF Store Shutdown Data Corruption** (csrf_store.go:189-196) - **Problem**: Stop() calls save() after signaling worker. Both hold only RLock - Worker's final save writes to csrf_tokens.json.tmp - Stop()'s save writes to same file concurrently - **Impact**: Corrupted/truncated csrf_tokens.json on shutdown - **Fix**: Added saveMu mutex to serialize all disk writes **P0-5: CSRF Store Deadlock on Double-Stop** (csrf_store.go:103-108) - **Problem**: stopChan unbuffered, no sync.Once guard, uses send not close - **Impact**: Second Stop() call blocks forever waiting for receiver - **Fix**: - Added sync.Once field stopOnce - Changed to close(stopChan) within stopOnce.Do() - Prevents double-close panic and deadlock All fixes maintain backwards compatibility. The recovery token fix is particularly critical as it closes a security vulnerability allowing replay attacks on password reset flows.
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3 changed files with 32 additions and 7 deletions
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@ -25,9 +25,11 @@ type CSRFToken struct {
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type CSRFTokenStore struct {
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tokens map[string]*CSRFToken
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mu sync.RWMutex
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saveMu sync.Mutex // Serializes disk writes to prevent save corruption
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dataPath string
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saveTicker *time.Ticker
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stopChan chan bool
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stopOnce sync.Once // Ensures Stop() can only close channel once
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}
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func csrfSessionKey(sessionID string) string {
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@ -99,9 +101,11 @@ func (c *CSRFTokenStore) backgroundWorker() {
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// Stop gracefully stops the CSRF store
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func (c *CSRFTokenStore) Stop() {
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c.saveTicker.Stop()
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c.stopChan <- true
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c.save()
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c.stopOnce.Do(func() {
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c.saveTicker.Stop()
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close(c.stopChan) // Close instead of send to signal all readers
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c.save()
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})
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}
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// GenerateCSRFToken creates a new CSRF token for a session
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@ -183,6 +187,10 @@ func (c *CSRFTokenStore) cleanup() {
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// save persists CSRF tokens to disk
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func (c *CSRFTokenStore) save() {
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// Serialize all disk writes to prevent corruption
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c.saveMu.Lock()
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defer c.saveMu.Unlock()
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c.mu.RLock()
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defer c.mu.RUnlock()
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c.saveUnsafe()
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@ -149,6 +149,15 @@ func (r *RecoveryTokenStore) ValidateRecoveryTokenConstantTime(providedToken str
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// Need to upgrade to write lock to mark as used
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r.mu.RUnlock()
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r.mu.Lock()
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// CRITICAL: Re-check token.Used after acquiring write lock
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// Prevents replay attack where two concurrent requests both pass initial check
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if token.Used {
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r.mu.Unlock()
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r.mu.RLock()
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return false
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}
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token.Used = true
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token.UsedAt = time.Now()
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token.IP = ip
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@ -341,8 +341,12 @@ func (h *Hub) Run() {
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Data: map[string]string{"message": "Connected to Pulse WebSocket"},
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}
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if data, err := json.Marshal(welcomeMsg); err == nil {
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// Check if client is still registered before sending
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if _, ok := h.clients[client]; ok {
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// Check if client is still registered before sending (must hold lock)
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h.mu.RLock()
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_, stillRegistered := h.clients[client]
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h.mu.RUnlock()
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if stillRegistered {
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log.Info().Str("client", client.id).Msg("Sending welcome message")
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select {
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case client.send <- data:
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@ -368,8 +372,12 @@ func (h *Hub) Run() {
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Data: sanitizeData(stateData),
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}
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if data, err := json.Marshal(initialMsg); err == nil {
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// Check if client is still registered before sending
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if _, ok := h.clients[client]; ok {
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// Check if client is still registered before sending (must hold lock)
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h.mu.RLock()
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_, stillRegistered := h.clients[client]
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h.mu.RUnlock()
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if stillRegistered {
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log.Info().Str("client", client.id).Int("dataLen", len(data)).Int("dataKB", len(data)/1024).Msg("Sending initial state to client")
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select {
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